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Gary M. Lucas, Jr.* 
ABSTRACT 
Economists across the political spectrum argue that a carbon tax is the most effective 
and economically efficient policy for addressing climate change. Voters, however, strongly 
oppose the carbon tax and instead favor “green” subsidies and command-and-control 
regulations. If carefully designed, these policies might complement a carbon tax, but by 
themselves, they will make global warming mitigation incredibly expensive and perhaps 
even infeasible. Moreover, if poorly designed, subsidies and regulations can be 
counterproductive. 
This Article argues that the public dislikes the carbon tax because the tax possesses 
attributes that make it psychologically unappealing relative to other climate policy 
instruments. The Article also argues that even if carbon tax proponents eventually persuade 
voters to accept a carbon tax, voters are biased in favor of particular design features that 
would make the tax less efficient. The Article discusses ways to overcome the problems that 
voter psychology creates. These include a communications strategy designed to combat voter 
bias and the controversial proposition that bureaucrats, who are somewhat insulated from 
public pressure, might adopt a carbon tax administratively. The Article also contributes to 
the burgeoning literature on how psychology affects the law and public policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate policy faces an uncertain future. On the one hand, President Trump has called 
global warming a “hoax,”1 and he has indicated that he will “cancel” the Paris Agreement 
on climate change2 and dismantle the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan.3 
 
1.  President Trump has said various times and in various media that climate change is a “hoax.” See, e.g., 
Louis Jacobson, Trump Says U.S. Pulling Out of Paris Climate Agreement, POLITIFACT (June 1, 2017), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/promise/1379/cancel-paris-climate-agreement/ 
[perma: http://perma.cc/6JN7-Y8CS]. 
2.  Philip Rucker & Jenna Johnson, Trump Announces U.S. Will Exit Paris Climate Deal, Sparking Criticism at 
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On the other hand, a number of influential conservatives have now acknowledged that 
climate change is a problem and advocate a large role for government in resolving it.4 Some 
commentators have even speculated that President Trump might use revenue from a national 
carbon tax to pay for his plan to increase infrastructure spending and cut income taxes.5 
Moreover, even if the Trump Administration does nothing to address climate change, many 
states have adopted or are considering ambitious proposals to address global warming, 
including cap-and-trade programs, carbon taxes, and renewable portfolio standards.6 
Finally, a majority of the American public believes that global warming is a real problem 
that the government should address, which increases the likelihood that the federal 
government will eventually take significant action.7 
If and when policy makers intervene, economists across the political spectrum argue 
that a carbon tax is the most effective and economically efficient policy available.8 The 
public, however, overwhelmingly opposes taxing carbon.9 Instead of supporting the solution 
 
Home and Abroad, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-announce-us-will-
exit-paris-climate-deal/2017/06/01/fbcb0196-46da-11e7-bcde-
624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.8ae7b2f3089c [perma: http://perma.cc/5DDl-PSY7]. 
3.  Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 13201; 
President Trump Remarks at Senator Strange Campaign Rally, C-SPAN (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.c-
span.org/video/?434480-1/president-trump-campaigns-alabama-senator-luther-strange [perma: 
http://perma.cc/5775-F7FE]. 
4.  E.g., John Schwartz, ‘A Conservative Climate Solution’: Republican Group Calls for Carbon Tax, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/science/a-conservative-climate-solution-republican-group-
calls-for-carbon-tax.html?_r=2 [perma: http://perma.cc/HAD7-GX26]; George P. Shultz & James A. Baker III, A 
Conservative Answer to Climate Change, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-conservative-
answer-to-climate-change-1486512334 [perma: http://perma.cc/3H9T-84XR].  
5.  E.g., Harold Hedelman, How Could Trump Spend a $1.2T Climate Dividend, BUSINESS CLIMATE LEADERS (Feb. 1, 
2017), http://www.businessclimateleaders.org/blog/2017/2/8/how-could-trump-spend-a-12t-climate-dividend 
[perma: http://perma.cc/ZMG3-5HX9]; Jerry Taylor, Carbon Tax, RIP?, NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://niskanencenter.org/blog/carbon-tax-rip/ [perma: http://perma.cc/L9YW-MGK9].  
6.  Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy 
Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 190 (2017); Barry G. Rabe, A New Era in States’ Climate Policies?, in 
CHANGING CLIMATE POLITICS: U.S. POLICIES AND CIVIC ACTION 55, 63–78 (Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias ed., 2015); Yoram Bauman 
& Charles Komanoff, Opportunities for Carbon Taxes at the State Level, CARBON TAX CTR., 
http://www.carbontax.org/states/ [perma: http://perma.cc/R9TG-3AQK] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017); Peter Vail & 
Dallas Burtraw, A Look at Six State Proposals to Tax Carbon, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE: COMMON RESOURCES BLOG (Mar. 
18, 2016), http://www.rff.org/blog/2016/look-six-state-proposals-tax-carbon [perma: http://perma.cc/EC3Z-
S6PN]. 
7.  See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 3–4 (Mar. 2015) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ 
ET AL., AMERICAN MIND], http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Global-Warming-CCAM-March-
2015.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/9YP8-ESVK]; Matthew C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, Twenty Years of Public Opinion 
About Global Warming, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 444, 450 (2007); Environment, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx [perma: http://perma.cc/QPZ9-Y9QV] (last visited Oct. 16, 
2017).  
8.  For lists of prominent conservative and liberal economists who advocate a carbon tax, see SHI-LING HSU, THE 
CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 183–86 (2011) [hereinafter HSU, CASE FOR A 
CARBON TAX]; WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS FOR A WARMING WORLD 314 (2013); 
Conservatives, CARBON TAX CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/conservatives/ [perma:  http://perma.cc/LR7P-YQCU] 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2017).  
9.  See, e.g., DAVID AMDUR ET AL., NAT’L SURVEYS ON ENERGY & ENV’T, PUBLIC VIEWS ON A CARBON TAX DEPEND ON THE 
PROPOSED USE OF REVENUE 3 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652403 [perma:  
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recommended by policy experts, the public favors green subsidies and command-and-control 
regulations.10 If carefully designed, these policies might complement a carbon tax, but by 
themselves, they will make global warming mitigation incredibly expensive and perhaps 
even infeasible.11 Moreover, if poorly designed, subsidies and regulations can be 
counterproductive.12 
This Article argues that the public dislikes the carbon tax because the tax possesses 
attributes that make it psychologically unappealing relative to other climate policy 
instruments. Unlike policy experts, voters spend little time considering policy proposals and 
evaluate them superficially. This increases the likelihood that they will rely on potentially 
misleading decision heuristics and makes them more vulnerable to cognitive and emotional 
biases and to interest groups, politicians, and others who may benefit from exploiting those 
biases.13 In this Article I argue, for example, that in evaluating climate policies, voters 
engage in an intuitive cost-benefit analysis that, due to various cognitive biases, ignores the 
benefits of the carbon tax while also exaggerating its costs relative to other climate policies. 
Simply put, voters are biased against the carbon tax—a fact that poses a significant 
challenge to carbon tax proponents. 
The Article further argues that even if proponents can somehow persuade voters to 
support a carbon tax, voters are biased in favor of particular design features that would 
make the tax less efficient. For example, an efficient tax would apply economy-wide with 
few exemptions. But public opinion polls and evidence from countries that have adopted 
carbon taxes suggest that, largely for psychological reasons, voters are more likely to 
support a carbon tax if the government exempts certain sectors of the economy.14 
The Article makes an original contribution to the legal literature by explaining in 
detail the heuristics and biases that impose barriers to the adoption of an efficient carbon 
tax. The Article also contributes to the burgeoning literature on how voter psychology affects 
the law and public policy.15 
For the many scientists and policy makers concerned about global warming, the carbon 
tax represents the best hope for substantially reducing carbon emissions at an acceptable 
 
http://perma.cc/3ZHR-5WX5] (finding that when no use of the revenue was specified, only 34% of those surveyed 
supported a carbon tax); BARRY G. RABE ET AL., NAT’L SURVEYS ON ENERGY & ENV’T, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REGULATION OF POWER 
PLANT EMISSIONS UNDER THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 4 (2015) [hereinafter RABE ET AL., PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REGULATION], 
http://closup.umich.edu/files/ieep-nsee-2015-clean-power-plan.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/VS9V-AMHJ] (finding 
that only 31% of adults support their state “[i]ncreasing taxes on ALL fossil fuels used in generating electricity in 
order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”); RES. FOR THE FUTURE, N.Y. TIMES & STANFORD UNIV., GLOBAL WARMING NATIONAL 
POLL 44, 46 (2015), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Documents/RFF-NYTimes-Stanford-global-warming-poll-
Jan-2015-topline-part-3.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/4BHX-LBB9] (finding that only 25% of adults support a tax on 
electricity and 36% support a tax on gasoline to reduce global warming).   
10.  See infra Part II.A for an analysis of public opinion regarding climate policy instruments.  
11.  See infra Part I.B. 
12.  See infra Part I.B.  
13.  See infra Part II.B. Heuristics are rules of thumb that simplify decisions but that sometimes produce 
systematic errors. See Thomas Gilovich et al., Preface to HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, at 
xv, xv (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 8th prtg. 2009).  
14.  See infra Part III.B.  
15.  For a review of the literature, see generally Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice 
and the Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 199 (2015).  
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cost.16 To realize this goal, policy makers must devise ways to overcome the psychological 
hurdles that impede adoption of an efficient carbon tax. To that end, the Article discusses 
potential solutions to the problems posed by voters’ anti-carbon-tax bias. These include a 
communications strategy designed to combat bias and the controversial proposition that 
bureaucrats, who are more insulated from voter influence than politicians, might circumvent 
the legislative process and adopt a carbon tax administratively. 
Section I provides background by briefly describing why economists and climate policy 
experts favor a carbon tax as well as why green subsidies and command-and-control 
regulations are at best insufficient and at worst inefficient and counterproductive. Section II 
discusses the influence of psychology on voters’ preferences with respect to climate policy 
instruments and why voters are biased against the carbon tax. Section III shifts the focus 
from whether the government should adopt a carbon tax to the details of what the carbon 
tax might look like if adopted. Specifically, Section III explains why voters are biased in 
favor of particular design features that would make the tax less efficient. Section IV 
discusses possibilities for overcoming the psychological hurdles that impede adoption of an 
efficient carbon tax. 
I. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR A CARBON TAX 
This Section briefly explains why economists favor addressing global warming using a 
carbon tax. Part I.A discusses why the carbon tax is such an attractive policy. Part I.B 
describes the problems associated with other climate policies. I intend for this Section to 
provide only the background needed to understand the rest of the Article, so the discussion 
is not comprehensive. Moreover, this Section discusses a theoretically optimal carbon tax, 
which I admit places the policy in the best light possible. I discuss the practical problems 
associated with implementation in Section III. 
A. What Makes the Carbon Tax an Attractive Policy 
The basic case for a carbon tax is textbook economics.17 By contributing to global 
warming, people who consume carbon-intensive goods impose a cost, or negative 
externality, on society. The market prices of carbon-intensive goods do not reflect the carbon 
externality, so consumers buy more of those goods than they would if prices reflected all 
social costs.18 This means that some carbon-intensive goods are produced and consumed 
even though their social value is less than their social cost, a condition that is economically 
inefficient.19 The standard remedy for negative externalities is to impose what economists 
refer to as a Pigouvian tax (named after the economist Arthur Pigou).20 Taxing goods that 
produce negative externalities increases their price to reflect their full social cost. In this 
 
16.  Ian Parry, Summary for Policymakers, in IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, at xxiii, 
xxv (Ian Parry et al. eds., 2015) (noting that “there is near-universal agreement among economists that [carbon 
pricing] will be essential if US emissions are ultimately to be rolled back at reasonable cost”).  
17.  See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 134–46 (2d ed. 2007); HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, 
PUBLIC FINANCE 85–94 (8th ed. 2008).  
18.  N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 197–99 (6th ed. 2007). 
19. Id. This condition is economically inefficient because the quantity of the carbon-intensive good produced is 
greater than the quantity that would be produced if all social costs were considered. Id. at 198–99.  
20.  Id. at 202–04. 
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case, the optimal Pigouvian tax equals the marginal social cost of emitting carbon,21 which 
economists have estimated by forecasting the likely damage caused by global warming.22 An 
optimal tax would force consumers and producers to internalize the carbon externality and 
reduce the production and consumption of carbon-intensive goods to the economically 
efficient level. 
In addition to this simple logic, economists point to four features of the carbon tax that 
make it especially attractive vis-à-vis other climate policies. First, the tax could be broad-
based and apply upstream directly to the small number of firms that extract, process, or 
import fossil fuels.23 Fossil fuel suppliers would then pass on most of the cost to consumers, 
thereby increasing the prices of carbon-intensive goods, which would encourage emissions 
reduction across all sectors of the economy and avoid the inefficient reallocation of resources 
from taxed to untaxed sectors.24 A broad-based carbon tax would incentivize everyone—
from homeowners to drivers to power companies—to reduce emissions.25 
Second, a carbon tax would minimize the cost of emissions reduction.26 Some 
abatement opportunities cost more than others. With a carbon tax in place, consumers and 
producers who can abate emissions at a cost less than that of the tax will do so, and those 
who cannot will simply pay the tax. This means that the marginal cost of abatement will be 
uniform (i.e., equal to the tax rate) throughout the economy so that society cannot cheaply 
reallocate abatement from one economic sector to another.27 
Third, a carbon tax could raise significant revenue. The government could use this 
revenue to fund additional spending, to reduce the deficit, or to cut income and other 
distortionary taxes that reduce the incentive to work and save, and that adversely affect 
economic growth.28 In particular, using the revenue to cut distortionary taxes would avoid 
much of the economic damage that a carbon tax would otherwise impose, thereby 
substantially reducing the cost of addressing global warming.29 
The government could also use carbon tax revenue to address one of the most highly 
visible problems with the tax—the fact that it would be regressive. While economists debate 
exactly how regressive a carbon tax would be, the burden of it would likely fall 
disproportionately upon the poor given that they spend a larger share of their incomes on 
 
21.  Id. at 203. 
22.  E.g., INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL 
COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 4 (2016).  
23.  Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 501–29 
(2009) (noting that the government could cover virtually all emissions from fossil fuels by imposing a carbon tax 
upstream at fewer than three thousand points, such as coal mines and oil refineries).   
24.  See id. 
25.  See id. 
26.  See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 17, at 87–88.  
27.  Id. at 87.  
28.  Roberton C. Williams III & Casey J. Wichman, Macroeconomic Effects of Carbon Taxes, in IMPLEMENTING A 
US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, supra note 16, at 83, 86–91.  
29.  Id. at 84–89; see also JARED C. CARBONE ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DEFICIT REDUCTION AND CARBON TAXES: 
BUDGETARY, ECONOMIC, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS 7–8 (2013), 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-Carbone.etal.CarbonTaxes.pdf [perma: 
http://perma.cc/P3A4-D7V9]; DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., DOUBLE DIVIDEND: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND FISCAL REFORM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 334 (2013); Lawrence H. Goulder, Climate Change Policy’s Interactions with the Tax System, 40 ENERGY 
ECON. S3, S4–9 (2013).  
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carbon-intensive goods.30 Fortunately, economists estimate that the government could 
eliminate the burden on the poor—for example, by mailing them rebate checks or 
increasing the earned income tax credit—using only a small fraction of carbon tax 
revenue.31 
Finally, a carbon tax could include carbon tariffs (sometimes called “border tax 
adjustments”) to cope with free riders and with leakage.32 Although addressing climate 
change requires global cooperation, each country has an incentive to avoid the costs of 
emissions reduction while free riding on the efforts of others.33 The United States could 
potentially deal with this problem by imposing carbon tariffs on imports from countries that 
do not adopt climate policies of their own. Carbon tariffs could also address leakage, which 
occurs when production of carbon-intensive goods shifts to countries that do not tax or 
regulate carbon emissions.34 Tariffs reduce the benefits of relocating production to renegade 
countries that act as free riders.35 
B. Why Other Policies Can Be Problematic 
In addition to or in lieu of a carbon tax, the government could address climate change 
via a cap-and-trade program, command-and-control regulations, or green subsidies. This 
Part explains why these policies can be problematic. 
1. Cap-and-Trade 
Under a cap-and-trade program, the government would restrict carbon emissions by 
creating a limited number of emissions permits and requiring that regulated firms obtain 
and then surrender a permit for each ton of carbon emitted.36 After the government created 
and distributed the permits, firms could buy and sell them on a secondary market.37 
In theory, a cap-and-trade program could have effects similar to a broad-based carbon 
tax so long as it applied upstream to fossil fuel suppliers and the government initially 
distributed carbon permits by auction.38 Fossil fuel suppliers would increase the prices of 
fossil fuels to reflect the cost of the carbon permits.39 As a result, as with a carbon tax, the 
prices of goods would increase in proportion to their carbon intensity.40 
But even in its theoretically ideal form, cap-and-trade would simply mimic the effects 
 
30.  Adele Morris & Aparna Mathur, The Distributional Burden of a Carbon Tax: Evidence and Implications for 
Policy, in IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, supra note 16, at 97, 101–07.  
31.  Aparna Mathur & Adele C. Morris, Distributional Effects of a Carbon Tax in Broader U.S. Fiscal Reform, 66 
ENERGY POL’Y 326, 333 (2014).  
32.  Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 23, at 540–52.  
33.  Id. at 540.  
34.  Id. at 502.  
35.  Id. at 545–49. 
36.  Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 293, 298 (2008).  
37.  Id. 
38.  ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 17, at 90–94; Stavins, supra note 36, at 305–10.  
39.  Stavins, supra note 36, at 310.  
40.  Id. 
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of a carbon tax while adding significant complexity.41 Moreover, in practice, to reduce 
opposition among regulated industries, governments that have adopted cap-and-trade 
programs have often chosen not to auction permits but instead to give them away to the 
firms that must reduce their emissions.42 Firms that receive permits for free would still incur 
a cost if they later surrendered the permits to cover their emissions; specifically, they would 
incur the opportunity cost of not selling the permits on the secondary market.43 Firms will 
generally pass this cost on to consumers by raising prices despite the fact that the firms 
themselves did not pay for the permits.44 As a result, a cap-and-trade program in which the 
government gives permits away for free effectively becomes a carbon tax, returning the tax 
revenue to the regulated firms.45 This practice would result in windfall profits for 
shareholders and also increases the program’s overall cost by forfeiting auction revenue 
that the government could have used to cut distortionary taxes.46 
In addition, in real-world cap-and-trade programs, prices of emissions permits have 
proven extremely volatile.47 Price volatility is problematic because it introduces risk for 
investors, complicates planning by firms, and makes firms less willing to develop clean 
technologies.48 In contrast to cap-and-trade, a carbon tax avoids price volatility because the 
price of emissions does not change unless the government changes the tax rate.49 For this 
and other more technical reasons, many economists prefer a carbon tax to cap-and-trade 
despite the fact that it is theoretically possible for the government to efficiently price carbon 
emissions using either approach.50 
2. Command-and-Control Regulations and Green Subsidies 
Traditionally, the federal government has addressed environmental problems through 
command-and-control regulations and green subsidies. In the climate context, command-
and-control regulations mandate that regulated firms adopt a particular emissions-
abatement technology or achieve a minimal level of performance in reducing emissions.51 
 
41.  See Barry G. Rabe, The “Impossible Dream” of Carbon Taxes: Is the “Best Answer” a Political Non-
Starter?, in GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN AMERICA 126, 131 (Barry G. Rabe ed., 2010) 
[hereinafter Rabe, Carbon Taxes].  
42.  See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 
207–16 (2011); Gary M. Lucas, Jr., The Taxation of Emissions Permits Distributed for Free as Part of a Carbon Cap-
and-Trade Program, 1 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 16, 16 (2010).  
43.  See GRAETZ, supra note 42, at 235–37.  
44.  See id. at 236–37.  
45.  See id.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2 EMISSIONS 2–5 (2017), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8946/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/W7YG-3GXZ] 
(discussing why a firm receiving a permit for free would raise prices and, as a result, experience a windfall).   
46.  Goulder, supra note 29, at S7.  
47.  See GRAETZ, supra note 42, at 207; NORDHAUS, supra note 8, at 235–39.  
48.  NORDHAUS, supra note 8, at 239; Alan Krupnick & Ian Parry, What Is the Best Policy Instrument for 
Reducing CO2 Emissions?, in FISCAL POLICY TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 14 (Ian W.H. Parry et 
al. eds., 2012).  
49.  Krupnick & Parry, supra note 48, at 15.  
50.  E.g., Ian Parry, Choosing Among Mitigation Instruments: How Strong Is the Case for a US Carbon Tax?, in 
IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, supra note 16, at 18, 34–35 [hereinafter Parry, Mitigation 
Instruments].  
51.  Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 115, 127 [hereinafter 
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Prominent examples include regulations that require power companies to produce electricity 
from renewable sources or that impose fuel efficiency standards on car manufacturers.52 
Green subsidies, on the other hand, attempt to encourage low-carbon activities and clean 
technologies.53 Current and past examples include the income tax credit for hybrid cars as 
well as subsidies for corn-based ethanol, the hydrogen fuel cell, and carbon sequestration 
technology.54 
Addressing global warming primarily through regulations and subsidies would be 
much more expensive than if the government used a carbon tax.55 Consider first the 
problems with regulation. As discussed above, a broad-based carbon tax would incentivize 
emissions reduction throughout the economy.56 By contrast, the government could not 
possibly regulate all sources of emissions without massive intrusion into both the economy 
and people’s private lives. The resulting gaps in regulation would entail missed 
opportunities to cheaply abate emissions.57 Moreover, selecting the most cost-effective 
abatement technology or the optimal performance standard for a particular industry 
requires detailed information that the government cannot easily obtain, and obtaining that 
information is much more difficult than simply estimating the appropriate carbon tax rate.58 
Worse yet, political considerations and special interest influence plague the regulatory 
process.59 
The upshot is that under any real-world regulatory scheme, the marginal cost of 
abatement will vary significantly from one economic sector to another.60 This means that it 
would be possible to achieve a given level of abatement at a lower cost. Contrast this 
undesirable result with a carbon tax that places a uniform price on emissions, which 
ultimately results in a uniform marginal cost of abatement and thereby minimizes 
abatement costs. 
The problems that afflict regulation are so severe that the economist William 
Nordhaus, one of the world’s leading authorities on the economics of global warming, 
argues that “[r]egulatory policies alone cannot come close to solving the global warming 
problem.”61 Nordhaus suggests that “carefully designed regulations in a few areas” might 
play a beneficial role, but he also warns that “regulations can be very costly or even 
counterproductive if they are not carefully designed.”62 Nordhaus notes that a “typical 
finding is that using inefficient regulations or approaches [would] double the costs” of 
climate change mitigation and would likely make it impossible to limit the global 
 
Lucas, Behavioral Public Choice]; see also ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 17, at 94–95.  
52.  Lucas, Behavioral Public Choice, supra note 51, at 127.  
53.  Id. at 129.  
54.  Id.  
55.  See ALAN J. KRUPNICK ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE & NAT’L ENERGY POLICY INST., TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL ENERGY 
POLICY: ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 69–112 (2010), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-
NEPI%20Tech%20Manual_Final.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/P6KW-SD9F].  
56.  See supra Part I.A. 
57.  Parry, Mitigation Instruments, supra note 50, at 27.  
58.  HSU, CASE FOR A CARBON TAX, supra note 8, at 59.  
59.  See id. at 59–60.  
60.  See GRUBER, supra note 17, at 142.  
61.  NORDHAUS, supra note 8, at 272.  
62.  Id.  
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temperature increase to the level that climate scientists find acceptable.63 Nordhaus’s view 
that regulation would prove more expensive than a carbon tax is well accepted among 
economists.64 
Similarly, green subsidies are notoriously problematic.65 Identifying which low-carbon 
activities and clean technologies to subsidize requires significant information that the 
government cannot easily obtain.66 As with regulations, special interest influence plagues 
the process, so many subsidies produce little to no environmental benefit.67 Moreover, 
subsidies are costly because the government must pay for them by increasing distortionary 
taxes like the income tax or by increasing its budget deficit.68 As a result, many economists 
are skeptical of subsidizing specific technologies and argue that, if anything, the 
government should limit subsidies to basic research related to climate change and 
renewable energy.69 
The dim view of regulations and subsidies that I have just outlined is supported by 
standard economic models of climate change. Those models imply that the government can 
optimally address global warming via a carbon tax, and that such a tax would largely 
eliminate the need for other policies.70 
Nonetheless, recent breakthroughs in modeling the economics of innovation have now 
added an important caveat to the standard analysis.71 The idea underlying these models is 
that innovation is path dependent because of complementarities, network effects, and high 
switching costs—a fact that standard models ignore.72 In the energy field, for example, 
because of the historical dominance of fossil fuels, more scientists are researching carbon-
 
63.  Id. at 179.  
64.  See Carbon Tax, CHI. BOOTH: IGM FORUM (Dec. 20, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-
economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_9Rezb430SESUA4Y [perma: http://perma.cc/VV6K-XT8H] 
(polling over fifty distinguished economists and finding that the overwhelming majority agreed that a “tax on the 
carbon content of fuels would be a less expensive way to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions than would a collection of 
policies such as ‘corporate average fuel economy’ requirements for automobiles”).  
65.  For a creative proposal to reform green subsidies, see generally Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: 
Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303 (2014).  
66.  See GRAETZ, supra note 42, at 186–87.  
67.  Id. at 187–95; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL COMM. ON THE EFFECTS OF PROVISIONS IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, 
EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 8 (William Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013).  
68.  Charles L. Ballard & Steven G. Medema, The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes and Subsidies in the 
Presence of Externalities: A Computational Equilibrium Approach, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 199, 214–15 (1993).  
69.  E.g., Richard G. Newell, The Role of Energy Technology Policy Alongside Carbon Pricing, in IMPLEMENTING A 
US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, supra note 16, at 178, 188.   
70.  See, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law 18–19 (Yale Law 
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 571, May 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927441 [perma: 
http://perma.cc/X74Z-4EDJ]) (discussing the standard view).  
71.  For nontechnical introductions, see generally PHILIPPE AGHION ET AL., PATH DEPENDENCE, INNOVATION, AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2014) [hereinafter AGHION ET AL., PATH DEPENDENCE] and Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 70. 
For formal modeling papers, see generally Daron Acemoglu et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change, 
102 AM. ECON. REV. 131 (2012); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change in a North-
South Model, 30 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 513 (2014); Daron Acemoglu et al., Transition to Clean Technology, 124 J. 
POL. ECON. 52 (2016) [hereinafter Acemoglu et al., Transition to Clean Technology]; and Philippe Aghion et al., Carbon 
Taxes, Path Dependency, and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Auto Industry, 124 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2016).  
72.  AGHION ET AL., PATH DEPENDENCE, supra note 71, at 6–7.  
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intensive technologies than clean technologies. Also, inventors and entrepreneurs have a 
strong incentive to develop products that leverage the existing carbon-intensive 
infrastructure. For example, innovations with respect to gasoline cars are easier to market 
than those for electric cars simply because of the high number of gas stations relative to 
charging stations. Finally, network effects, which exist when a product becomes more 
attractive because more people are using it (think of telephones), enhance the benefits of 
adopting carbon-intensive technologies and reduce the value to end users of unilaterally 
switching to clean technologies.73 The end result is that the economy is currently locked into 
the use of fossil fuels and carbon-intensive technologies even though society would be better 
off with clean energy.74 Network effects and high switching costs pose significant barriers to 
clean-technology innovation and to converting from and reducing reliance on fossil fuels.75 
Unlike standard economic models, models that incorporate path-dependent innovation 
imply a significant role for government in actively encouraging clean technologies in 
addition to taxing carbon.76 Because they cannot unilaterally bring about the shift to clean 
energy, individual scientists, inventors, investors, and firms have an insufficient incentive to 
put resources into clean-technology innovations.77 The government can overcome this inertia 
by making a “push” toward clean energy through green subsidies and regulations that 
encourage clean technologies.78 As knowledge increases with respect to clean energy, 
innovators in the area will be able to “stand on the shoulders of giants.”79 Progress will 
occur and costs will decline at a rapid rate. After the economy crosses some critical 
threshold, it will then become locked into clean energy rather than fossil fuels. At that point, 
the forces of path dependence (complementarities, network effects, and high switching costs) 
will work in favor of the environment instead of against it. Eventually, the government will 
no longer need to intervene to promote clean energy (except by continuing to tax carbon).80 
While models of path-dependent innovation have changed our understanding of the 
government’s potential role in addressing global warming, it is important to recognize that 
they do not justify any and all subsidies and regulations that purport to be environmentally 
friendly. In fact, the wrong policies could not only waste significant resources, but they could 
also cause the economy to become locked into a dangerous path.81 For example, Dieter 
Helm, a prominent British economist, has argued that the European Union’s climate policies 
have conferred large economic rents on special interests and have led to bad path 
dependence—locking in investment in costly offshore wind power at the expense of more 
promising renewables.82 Similarly, Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow have argued that 
fuel efficiency standards for cars “may perversely undermine climate efforts to the extent 
that they direct innovation away from zero-emission cars and toward improving the fuel 
 
73.  See id.  
74.  Id.  
75.  Id. 
76.  Acemoglu et al., Transition to Clean Technology, supra note 71, at 85–88.  
77.  AGHION ET AL., PATH DEPENDENCE, supra note 71, at 7.  
78.  See id.  
79.  Id. at 6.  
80.  Id. at 8.  
81.  Id. at 9–10.  
82.  DIETER HELM, THE CARBON CRUNCH 79–103 (2015).  
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efficiency of fossil-fuel vehicles.”83 Philippe Aghion and his colleagues have also cautioned 
that while policies that encourage the transition from coal to cleaner natural gas may reduce 
emissions in the short run, they may also lock in long-lived natural gas infrastructure, which 
could impede the development of renewables.84 
The takeaway then is that path-dependent innovation can justify carefully designed 
subsidies and regulations, but the literature in this area is in its infancy. More research is 
needed to determine exactly which activities and technologies the government should 
subsidize and encourage. In the meantime, subsidies and regulations can be wasteful and 
even counterproductive, especially if special interest groups play a large role in shaping 
them. 
II. VOTER PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHOICE OF CLIMATE POLICY INSTRUMENT 
Section I explained why economists and other policy experts tout the carbon tax. This 
Section turns away from the experts and focuses on the public. Part II.A uses evidence from 
opinion polls to show that, while the public believes that global warming is a problem, it 
completely disagrees with policy experts about how to address it. Specifically, voters 
overwhelmingly reject the carbon tax, preferring command-and-control regulations and 
green subsidies instead. The remainder of this Section argues that certain aspects of voter 
psychology undermine public support for the carbon tax. Part II.B discusses in general terms 
why people are especially likely to rely on potentially misleading heuristics and are 
particularly vulnerable to cognitive and emotional biases when they act in their capacity as 
voters. Parts II.C through II.G describe specific biases and psychological phenomena that 
create hurdles to the adoption of a carbon tax. Part II.H argues that psychology explains 
why conservative voters disagree with conservative economists about the carbon tax. 
A. Public Opinion on Climate Policy Instruments 
Despite the amount of media attention given to climate change denialism, numerous 
polls show that most Americans believe that global warming is real, that humans are at 
least partly responsible for it, and that the government should adopt policies to address it.85 
Nonetheless, the public does not agree with policy experts about what the government 
should do. Despite the persistent pleadings of economists, polls consistently find that less 
than 40% of the public favors mitigating climate change via a broad-based carbon tax or by 
taxing gasoline, electricity, or natural gas.86 
How, then, does the public think the government should respond? Instead of a carbon 
tax, the public strongly supports command-and-control regulations and green subsidies. 
Polls consistently find broad support (frequently exceeding 70%) for various regulations, 
including mandatory caps on industry emissions and more stringent fuel efficiency standards 
for cars.87 Similarly, strong support exists for subsidies such as tax credits for consumers 
 
83.  Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 70, at 41.  
84.  AGHION ET AL., PATH DEPENDENCE, supra note 71, at 12–13.  
85.  See supra note 9.  
86.  See supra notes 9–10.  
87.  See, e.g., KARLYN BOWMAN ET AL., AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, POLLS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, 
GLOBAL WARMING, AND NUCLEAR POWER 77–95 (2015), http://www.aei.org/wp-
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who purchase hybrid cars and energy-efficient appliances and tax breaks for power 
companies that switch to renewable energy.88 Even Republican voters, who are generally 
more skeptical of the global warming threat, frequently express support for regulations and 
subsidies, especially environmentally friendly tax breaks.89 
Public opinion regarding cap-and-trade is more difficult to interpret. Some polls find 
majority support while others do not, and many voters express no opinion.90 Perhaps the 
public is confused by the policy’s complexity or by the fact that, while cap-and-trade 
functions much like a carbon tax and is sometimes referred to as “cap-and-tax” by its 
opponents, it also contains features reminiscent of command-and-control regulation, such as 
the emissions cap. 
B. Voters’ Susceptibility to Bias 
Part II.A explained that voters are concerned about global warming, but they reject the 
climate policy favored by policy experts (the carbon tax) in favor of other polices (command-
and-control regulations and green subsidies) that by themselves would be insufficient and 
perhaps even counterproductive. This disagreement between voters and policy experts is 
important because findings in political science suggest that voters exercise significant 
influence over public policy.91 The remainder of this Section argues that certain features of 
voter psychology render the carbon tax anathema and expose voters to manipulation by 
politicians and special interest groups that oppose the tax. This Part lays the foundation for 
that claim by summarizing recent findings in the field of behavioral public choice that 
suggest people are especially likely to rely on potentially misleading heuristics and are 
 
content/uploads/2015/04/ENVIRONMENT.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/DY8V-4Q7W]; LEISEROWITZ ET AL., AMERICAN 
MIND, supra note 7, at 20; ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., POLITICS & GLOBAL WARMING 16 (2016) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ ET 
AL., GLOBAL WARMING], http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Global-Warming-Policy-
Politics-November-2016.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/6GRC-2AJB]; PEW RESEARCH CTR., LITTLE ENTHUSIASM, FAMILIAR 
DIVISIONS AFTER THE GOP’S BIG MIDTERM VICTORY: MOST EXPECT OBAMA TO GET LITTLE DONE OVER NEXT TWO YEARS 15 (2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/11/11-12-14-Post-election-release.pdf [perma: http://perma.cc/M7UY-
FFTE]; RES. FOR THE FUTURE, N.Y. TIMES & STANFORD UNIV., supra note 9, at 39; Nisbet & Myers, supra note 7, at 465–67; 
Spring 2014 Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH. POST (2014), 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/june-2014-washington-post-abc-news-poll/1075/ [perma: 
http://perma.cc/97X2-YW5U].  
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89.  See LEISEROWITZ ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 87, at 16; RABE ET AL., PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REGULATION, 
supra note 9, at 3; Christopher P. Borick, American Public Opinion and Climate Change, in GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: 
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Warming, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N (Jan. 12, 2015), http://environment.yale.edu/climate-
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THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 12 (Apr. 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/wp-
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particularly vulnerable to bias and manipulation when they act in their capacity as voters.92 
Behavioral public choice is an emerging field that extends behavioral economics to 
politics and shows how mental limitations and cognitive and emotional biases adversely 
affect the law and public policy.93 The behavioral public choice literature identifies at least 
three reasons that voters are especially prone to biased thinking and to using potentially 
misleading heuristics.94 
First, the fact that public policy is complex and the typical voter is grossly uninformed 
creates the perfect conditions for poor judgment.95 Elections almost never come down to a 
single vote,96 and if a particular voter makes a mistake by supporting the wrong politicians 
or policies, the bad consequences fall mostly on others.97 Indeed, researchers have 
confirmed that voters are in fact extremely ignorant.98 At the same time, unbiased thinking 
is hard; it requires significant effort, and our minds are often lazy.99 People who are 
uninformed and lack motivation often analyze complex problems very superficially by 
invoking simple cues and decision heuristics that sometimes cause errors.100 Moreover, 
emotions are especially likely to influence judgment and decisionmaking with respect to 
issues that are unfamiliar, are of little personal relevance, receive limited time and 
attention, and do not demand accuracy or detailed consideration.101 These conditions apply 
to most voters participating in policy debates.102 The upshot is that each individual voter can 
engage in lazy thinking and indulge his or her cognitive and emotional biases without 
personal consequence even though, in the aggregate, the results may be disastrous for 
society. For example, economist Bryan Caplan has presented evidence that the public suffers 
from “antiforeign bias, a tendency to underestimate the economic benefits of interaction 
with foreigners.”103 Antiforeign bias stems from suspicion of people who are different, and 
it creates support for tariffs and other protectionist policies that reduce social welfare.104 
Second, the political process does not provide the sort of feedback that voters need to 
learn from their mistakes.105 Sorting out the consequences of government intervention is an 
 
92.  For more comprehensive reviews, see generally Lucas & Tasic, supra note 15 and W. Kip Viscusi & Ted 
Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox of Government Policy, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 973 (2015).  
93.  See Lucas & Tasic, supra note 15, at 202–03.  
94.  For a more comprehensive discussion, see id. at 205–12.  
95.  Id. at 209 n.47, 211–12.  
96.  DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 304–05 (2003).  
97.  See Bryan Caplan, Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the Miracle of Aggregation, 26 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 198, 207–08 (2008).  
98.  MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 
(1996); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17–61 (2013).  
99.  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 31–49 (2011).  
100.  For a recent review of the literature on this point, see THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 281–86 
(3d ed. 2012).  
101.  Joseph P. Forgas, Affective Influences on Attitudes and Judgments, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 596, 
596–618 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model 
(AIM), 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 48–57 (1995).  
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incredibly difficult task, even for policy experts.106 Moreover, voters have limited incentive 
to avoid bias in interpreting whatever limited feedback they do receive.  
Finally, voters’ ignorance and lack of incentive to seek the truth leaves them exposed 
to politicians and special interest groups that stand to gain by preying on their 
vulnerabilities.107 Because the personal stakes are low, voters may not adequately discount 
propaganda, emotional appeals, and deceptive forms of political persuasion.108 In 
particular, psychologists who study persuasion have identified a central route and a 
peripheral route to changing people’s attitudes.109 The central route is to make high-quality 
arguments while the peripheral route involves manipulating superficial aspects of the 
message, such as employing an attractive or famous spokesperson or relying on the quantity 
of arguments rather than their quality. The peripheral route is especially effective when the 
audience lacks the knowledge or motivation to fully analyze arguments, particularly in 
settings involving group decisionmaking and diminished personal responsibility for 
outcomes.110 Again, these conditions characterize voting. 
All of this taken together suggests that voters’ evaluations of complex policies, 
including climate policy, will usually be superficial. Voters are likely to be distracted by 
irrelevant factors, to rely on faulty heuristics, to fall prey to biases, and to allow emotions to 
cloud their judgment. Moreover, politicians and special interest groups that have a lot to 
gain from deception may be able to exploit voters’ vulnerabilities. 
C. What You See Is All There Is (WYSIATI) and Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Having discussed voters’ generic susceptibility to bias and manipulation, the 
remainder of this Section argues that psychology explains why voters reject the carbon tax 
in favor of other policies that would be insufficient, inefficient, or even counterproductive. 
The search for a psychological explanation is motivated in large part by the disagreement 
between voters and policy experts that I have already noted. In addition, experimental 
evidence suggests that people are biased against Pigouvian taxes in general.111 In 
 
an Austrian Perspective, 18 CONST. POL. ECON. 127, 138 (2007) (“[D]ecisions in the market to either buy or abstain 
from buying are a direct signal to sellers, whereas in the political process voters do not have the same extent of 
feedback opportunities with respect to public policy offerings because they vote only periodically for representatives 
and their vote is rarely decisive.”); see also Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform 
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PSYCHOL. 123, 125–26 (1986).  
110.  Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 109, at 137–61.   
111.  Todd L. Cherry et al., The Impact of Trial Runs on the Acceptability of Environmental Taxes: Experimental 
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experimental settings, researchers have studied support for Pigouvian taxes by creating 
markets for fictitious goods that generate negative externalities and then asking study 
participants to participate in a referendum to determine whether to correct the externalities 
using a tax.112 In the laboratory, many people have rejected Pigouvian taxes even when the 
tax would have benefitted them and even when researchers carefully designed the tax so 
that it unambiguously enhanced the welfare of every participant in the experiment.113 In 
other words, aversion to Pigouvian taxes is so powerful that people will make welfare-
reducing choices to avoid them. On the other hand, experimental evidence has also shown 
that when people gain experience with Pigouvian taxes by participating in multiple 
laboratory trials, support for the taxes increases dramatically.114 This suggests that 
opposition to Pigouvian taxes may be a mistake that people can correct as experience 
reveals the benefits that the taxes confer. 
This Part considers the particular psychological biases that make the carbon tax 
unattractive to the public. This Part focuses on one of the most important cognitive biases 
that affects public policy—what you see is all there is (WYSIATI). WYSIATI describes our 
tendency to give too much weight to information that we are currently thinking about, while 
ignoring the possibility that other information might point to a different conclusion.115 
1. WYSIATI Generally 
Appreciating the importance of WYSIATI requires an understanding of how memory 
works and the way in which people form intuitive judgments. Because memory and intuitive 
judgment are crucial for understanding not only WYSIATI but also the other biases discussed 
below, I provide here a detailed overview of both. 
You can think of memory as a network of ideas, with each idea representing a node, 
similar to a knot on a fisherman’s net, and each node connected to other nodes via 
associative links.116 When you think of an idea, such as “eating,” the node corresponding to 
that idea is activated.117 Activation of one node spreads to the nearby nodes that are 
connected to it and those nodes may activate as well.118 For example, activating the eating 
node causes you immediately to think of related ideas like fork and dinner.119  
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Because activation of one node spreads to nearby nodes, the connections among nodes 
form retrieval paths that allow you to retrieve items from memory.120 The stronger the 
connection between nodes, the more likely that activation of one node will lead to activation 
of the other.121 Connections are strongest when they have been rehearsed frequently and 
recently.122 Moreover, vivid stimuli and emotionally arousing information are easier to 
consolidate in and retrieve from memory, in part because they facilitate strong 
connections.123 Finally, a node fires only after its activation level reaches its response 
threshold.124 Because activation accumulates, a node is more likely to fire if it is connected 
to multiple nodes that are also firing.125 As a result, you are more likely to think of an apple 
if you hear the word “fruit” in addition to the word “eat.” 
When you encounter a stimulus like the word “eat,” it triggers the automatic 
operations of associative memory.126 Much associative thinking occurs subconsciously.127 If, 
shortly after hearing the word “eat,” you encounter the word fragment “so_p,” you are 
likely to think of soup rather than soap.128 Psychologists would say that the word “eat” 
primes you to think of words like “soup” that are related to eating.129 Moreover, associative 
memory includes not only ideas and semantic information; it also links particular stimuli to 
emotions, motor responses, facial expressions, and goals.130 When you unexpectedly 
encounter the word “vomit,” your reaction is not simply cognitive, but also emotional and 
physical. 
The specific memories triggered by a stimulus depend on the context and tend to be 
coherent.131 For example, if you work on Wall Street, the word “bank” probably evokes 
thoughts of money, investment firms, and related ideas. If you live near a river, you may 
think instead of water, fish, and floods. Psychologists refer to this process as associative 
coherence, which is “the pattern of automatic activation in memory [that] tends to produce a 
comprehensive and internally consistent interpretation of the present situation, which is 
causally embedded in the context of the recent past, and incorporates appropriate emotions 
and preparedness for likely future events and for future actions.”132 
Associative memory and associative coherence help us understand a key feature of 
intuitive judgment—the strong and automatic tendency to jump to conclusions based on 
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limited evidence.133 This tendency is so fundamental to how the human mind works that the 
psychologist and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman coined the acronym WYSIATI—what you 
see is all there is—to describe it.134 
To illustrate WYSIATI, Kahneman poses the following question: “Will Mindik be a good 
leader? She is intelligent and strong.”135 In response to the words “intelligent” and 
“strong,” the processes of associative memory and associative coherence lead us to conclude 
that the answer is yes. Our minds (unconsciously) construct a coherent and plausible story 
based upon what we know. We associate intelligence and strength with good leadership, so 
the notion that Mindik will be a good leader fits nicely.  
Unfortunately, “strongly activated information is likely to be given more weight than it 
deserves and relevant knowledge that is not activated by the associative context will be 
underweighted or neglected.”136 In other words, we often ignore information that is relevant 
to a decision or judgment simply because we are not currently thinking about it—WYSIATI. 
We jump to the conclusion that Mindik will be a good leader without considering the 
possibility that she might also be corrupt and cruel, or more generally, that our initial 
intuitive judgment was based on a small amount of low quality data. According to 
Kahneman: 
You cannot help dealing with the limited information you have as if it were all 
there is to know. You build the best possible story from the information available 
to you, and if it is a good story, you believe it. Paradoxically, it is easier to 
construct a coherent story when you know little, when there are fewer pieces to 
fit into the puzzle. Our comforting conviction that the world makes sense rests on 
a secure foundation: our almost unlimited ability to ignore our ignorance.137 
In addition, in the quest for coherence, our minds frequently deemphasize conflicting 
information as a way of suppressing doubt; maintaining competing possibilities is more 
difficult than becoming certain.138 So once we judge that Mindik will be a good leader, we 
may discount subsequent evidence suggesting otherwise. 
We can try to avoid the pitfalls of WYSIATI, but doing so is hard. Resisting the urge to 
jump to conclusions about Mindik requires vigilance and a willingness to exert the effort 
required to think of reasons weighing against our intuitive judgment. Recall that our minds 
are frequently lazy in combating biases, so unless the stakes are high, why bother? 
Kahneman uses WYSIATI to explain a large number of related cognitive biases that he 
and other psychologists have identified over the past several decades, including 
overconfidence in our own knowledge and susceptibility to framing effects.139 If we can 
construct a satisfactory story based on the information currently activated in our minds, we 
often become overconfident in what we think we know because we fail to consider whether 
something critical is missing.140 Moreover, “subjective confidence . . . reflects the coherence 
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of the story” that we have constructed, which is misleading “because poor evidence can 
make a very good story.”141 
In addition, what we “see” at any given time—the information that is “on-screen” or 
currently activated in our minds—often depends on factors other than quality or relevance 
to the decision at hand. In particular, we are prone to accept the frame or characterization of 
the problems we encounter, and we often passively restrict our thoughts to elements and 
ideas made salient by the context or presentation.142 In other words, our response to a 
problem or answer to a question often depends critically on the associations triggered by the 
particular way in which the problem or question is framed. This means that information that 
is relevant may remain “off-screen” because it is implicit and not otherwise obvious. For 
example, one famous study found that people (including doctors) are more likely to opt for 
radiation therapy over surgery to treat lung cancer if they are told that of 100 people having 
surgery, 10 will die during surgery (mortality frame) than if they are told that 90 will 
survive (survival frame).143 While both frames contain the same information, the survival 
frame apparently is less likely to trigger thoughts of death, and WYSIATI. 
Because of WYSIATI, when voters think about policy proposals, we should not expect 
that they will refrain from jumping to conclusions simply because they are uninformed. They 
will instead form intuitive judgments based on the limited information that they possess and 
the associations triggered by the context in which they are considering the proposal. 
Moreover, they are unlikely to appreciate the importance of information that they do not 
have. In particular, voters are unlikely to seek out cost-benefit analyses prepared by experts 
who try to identify all possible consequences of various proposals. Instead of recognizing 
their own ignorance and withholding judgment or holding only highly tentative views, voters 
are likely to jump to conclusions and confidently embrace policies about which they know 
very little, as long as they can construct a plausible and coherent story as to why those 
policies make sense.  
In addition, voters’ policy preferences will be subject to pervasive salience and framing 
effects.144 In particular, voters will frequently focus on the obvious and intended effects of 
particular policies, ignoring potential but unintended consequences.145 Moreover, because 
personal experiences and emotionally arousing information are easier to encode and 
retrieve from memory, voters are likely to give disproportionate weight to compelling 
personal narratives, extreme events, and other vivid stimuli. They are also likely to pay less 
attention to statistical evidence and dry analysis.146 
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2. WYSIATI and the Carbon Tax 
For climate policy, WYSIATI matters because it influences which policy instruments 
voters prefer. Unlike economists who try to identify and measure all the potential costs and 
benefits of a proposed climate policy, most voters will quickly form intuitive judgments 
based on limited information. In particular, voters may engage in an intuitive cost-benefit 
analysis that accounts only for costs and benefits that are currently activated in memory—
those that are on-screen.147 In this subpart, I argue that WYSIATI biases voters against the 
carbon tax and in favor of other climate policies because the costs of the carbon tax are 
relatively more likely to appear on-screen, while the benefits are relatively more likely to 
remain off-screen. In addition, voters very likely exaggerate the cost of the carbon tax 
because they mistakenly equate tax payments with the policy’s welfare cost. 
a. Misjudging Costs 
As discussed in Section I, economists like the carbon tax because it minimizes the cost 
of emissions reduction. In this context, when economists refer to cost, they mean the losses 
in social welfare resulting from climate policy, including the additional resources that 
society must use, the consumption opportunities that people must forgo, and the reduction in 
economic growth that occurs because of efforts to mitigate global warming.148 Examples 
include a power company switching from cheap fossil fuels to more expensive renewable 
energy sources, a consumer driving less to cope with higher gasoline prices, and a decline in 
economic growth caused by distortions in labor and capital markets that results from the 
higher prices of energy-intensive goods. 
Understanding the welfare cost of climate policies is important because it allows us to 
contrast economists’ concept of cost with the public’s. Learning about a policy’s welfare cost 
requires a basic understanding of economics and an examination of economists’ cost 
estimates—a task that most voters will avoid. The difficulty of determining welfare cost is 
important because psychologists who study intuitive judgment have discovered that when 
faced with a hard question, people tend to automatically and unconsciously substitute an 
easier question.149 They are then confident in their response, but fail to notice the 
substitution.150 Because the welfare cost of various climate policies is a mystery to most, 
voters are likely to focus on the cost that is salient to them—the potential increase in their 
own out-of-pocket expenses. In other words, voters substitute the easier question “Will this 
policy increase my out-of-pocket expenses (or those of people I care about)?” for the harder 
question “How much of the welfare cost of this policy will fall on me (or those I care 
about)?” 
The public’s focus on out-of-pocket expenses creates two problems. First, out-of-pocket 
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expenses are not a good proxy for the welfare cost of the carbon tax. The tax paid may be 
highly salient to the person paying it, but from society’s perspective, the tax payment does 
not impose a welfare cost because it does not entail sacrificing economic resources. Instead, 
the tax payment is simply a transfer from the taxpayer to the government. The government 
can then spend the money on public goods or even return it to taxpayers via an income or 
payroll tax cut or via rebate checks. So if voters focus on the tax paid and ignore the 
possibility that the government might spend the resulting revenue in beneficial ways or 
return it by cutting other taxes, then they will overestimate the true welfare cost of the tax 
to themselves and others they care about.151 As discussed above, the welfare cost of the 
carbon tax or any climate policy includes lost resources, forgone consumption opportunities, 
and slower economic growth—all of which are likely invisible to those who lack training in 
economics. This is unfortunate because while a carbon tax entails highly visible and 
loathsome tax payments, it can also impose a much lower welfare cost than other 
policies.152 
Second, the out-of-pocket expenses associated with various climate policies are not 
equally salient. A carbon tax would obviously increase out-of-pocket expenditures for most 
people. People frequently pay for gasoline and routinely pay electric bills, so they are likely 
cognizant of how much they spend on these goods and of the effects of significant price 
changes. Moreover, many people already pay taxes on gasoline, so they know that gas 
taxes increase the price at the pump. The fact that a carbon tax would increase the prices of 
carbon-intensive goods and services is no secret and is in fact the policy’s intended result.153 
The same cannot be said for command-and-control regulations and green subsidies. 
Neither regulations nor subsidies directly require that ordinary people pay money to the 
government or anyone else. To be sure, regulations increase costs incurred by regulated 
firms, and those firms generally pass on their costs to consumers. Similarly, the government 
must pay for subsidies by increasing taxes, and the tax burden ultimately falls on 
individuals. But these additional out-of-pocket expenses occur indirectly, are hard to 
identify, are incidental to the policy objective, and are unintended by policy makers. As a 
result, they are less salient. For example, most people probably do not realize that fuel 
efficiency standards add a significant amount to the price of cars.154 This cost is hidden and 
hard even for experts to determine precisely. In addition, unlike with gasoline, people buy 
 
151.  Cf. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
253, 268 (2009) (stating that American “tradition emphasizes the negative of taxes (taking your money away) but 
rarely discusses the positive (what taxes can do for you)”); Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Policy in the Trump Era: Carbon Tax 
Rising? 6 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, research paper No. 834, Mar. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Hsu, Climate Policy], 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926476 [perma: http://perma.cc/GU3C-RLHD] (arguing that 
critics of carbon taxes often assume “that all carbon tax revenues would be gathered together as a pile of cash and 
burned”).  
152.  Hsu, Climate Policy, supra note 151, at 38–39.  
153.  Cf. Erich Kirchler, Differential Representations of Taxes: Analysis of Free Associations and Judgments of 
Five Employment Groups, 27 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 117, 123–27 (1998) (finding that study participants’ first reactions 
upon hearing the word “tax” were generally negative, including associating taxes with punishment).   
154.  See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,623, 62,666 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 
and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537) (providing government cost estimates); Mark R. Jacobsen, Evaluating US 
Fuel Economy Standards in a Model with Producer and Household Heterogeneity, 5 AM. ECON. J. 148, 173–76 (2013) 
(estimating welfare losses).  
  
22 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
 
cars infrequently so they are not as likely to be cognizant of any price increases resulting 
from regulation. 
Public opinion research supports both the notion that the public uses salient, out-of-
pocket expenses as a proxy for the welfare cost of proposed climate policies and the notion 
that the out-of-pocket expenses of regulations and subsidies are less salient than those of a 
carbon tax. As discussed in Part II.A of this Section, polls generally find strong support 
(frequently in excess of 70%) for global warming regulations and green subsidies. But these 
polls often fail to mention potential costs. To remedy this problem, some pollsters use two 
versions of the same question, one that does not refer to cost and one that indicates that the 
policy in question will increase the expenses of ordinary people. Support for regulations and 
subsidies declines substantially when costs are highlighted, and that is true even when the 
pollster mentions only a very small cost.155 By contrast, support for a carbon tax, which is 
already low, does not decline much (if at all) when pollsters mention that the tax will cost 
the typical person a small amount.156 Apparently, people automatically associate the word 
“tax” with the idea of cost so that mentioning cost has little effect on judgments about the 
carbon tax. On the other hand, references to regulations and subsidies do not automatically 
evoke thoughts about cost, so mentioning cost reduces support for these policies.157 
Recent experimental evidence reinforces these conclusions. In a carefully controlled 
laboratory experiment, economist David Heres and his colleagues created a market for a 
fictitious good that produced a negative externality.158 Heres explored whether his 
participants would support correcting the externality via a Pigouvian tax or a subsidy, both 
of which were designed to produce identical consequences (including an overall increase in 
the participants’ welfare).159 Heres found evidence that when the researchers were vague 
about how they would redistribute any tax revenue they collected, each participant assumed 
that he or she would not receive any of the revenue.160 As a result, the tax was 
unpopular.161 Informing the participants that they would each receive an equal share of the 
revenue, however, dramatically increased their perception of the benefits that would accrue 
to them personally as a result of the tax and substantially increased support.162 
On the other hand, when Heres and his colleagues were vague about exactly which 
participants would have to pay for the subsidy, each individual participant apparently did 
not worry that he or she would be called on to pay more than his or her fair share because 
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the vast majority of participants supported the proposal.163 Moreover, informing the 
participants that they would share the burden equally had only a small effect on each 
participant’s perception of his or her benefits from the subsidy, which suggests that the 
participants had assumed all along that would be the case or else had completely ignored 
the fact that someone would have to pay for the subsidy.164 
Heres’s results suggest that, in the absence of information to the contrary, voters will 
focus on the fact that a carbon tax requires them to make tax payments, and they will ignore 
the possibility that the government might return the resulting revenue. On the other hand, 
voters likely will not pay attention to the burden imposed by green subsidies or to the 
question of how that burden will be distributed.   
b. Misjudging Benefits 
WYSIATI also disadvantages the carbon tax because the many benefits of the tax are 
less salient than the benefits (real or imagined) of other climate policies. The primary 
benefit of climate policies is that, if designed correctly, they will reduce carbon emissions 
and mitigate global warming. As discussed in Section I, a carbon tax can achieve this goal, 
but it does so in a counterintuitive way. The tax itself does not directly benefit the 
environment. Environmental benefits occur indirectly as people change their behavior in 
response to the higher prices of carbon-intensive goods. People might modify their behavior 
in numerous ways that are not obvious or easily predictable. In fact, economists tout the 
carbon tax precisely because it will encourage people to think of novel ways to reduce 
emissions that no one could currently imagine. But this feature makes the tax 
psychologically unappealing. People tend to underestimate their ability to adapt when their 
circumstances change for the worse.165 For example, people are likely to project their current 
energy use into the future, ignoring how their behavior would change in response to a 
carbon tax. Shane Gunster reports that this is exactly what happened after the government 
in British Columbia announced that it was going to implement a carbon tax.166 British 
Columbians concluded that the tax would have little effect on their behavior, and they 
therefore viewed it as punishment for continuing to behave in a way in which they had no 
choice.167 
In addition, the indirect manner in which the carbon tax operates greatly confuses the 
public. For example, when researchers interviewed focus groups from various European 
countries, they found that in evaluating environmental taxes like the carbon tax, people did 
not focus on the incentive effects of the taxes, but instead they were preoccupied with how 
the government would use the resulting revenue.168 Many people failed to see the point of 
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an environmental tax and concluded that “it was all some kind of trick” unless the 
government earmarked tax revenue for environmental programs.169 Moreover, the focus 
groups indicated that improving public transportation, developing renewable energy, and 
improving energy efficiency produced benefits that were more transparent than those 
resulting from environmental taxes.170 Unlike the carbon tax, regulations and subsidies 
mandate or reward particular, easily identifiable actions intended to help the environment 
in ways that are obvious to the casual observer.171 
Survey evidence also supports the hypothesis that people do not associate the carbon 
tax with environmental benefits but instead focus on its costs. In a survey conducted in 
Switzerland, Andrea Baranzini and Stefano Carattini found that support for a carbon tax 
increased when the survey question referred to it as a “climate contribution” rather than as 
a tax.172 Interestingly, survey respondents supported the climate contribution even though 
the researchers explicitly informed them that it would increase the price of gasoline and 
heating fuels.173 Baranzini and Carattini noted that the term “‘[c]limate contribution’ may 
signal that the climate as we know it . . . requires help, whereas a ‘tax’ may recall a threat 
to disposable income.”174 
In addition to reducing carbon emissions, a carbon tax produces several other benefits 
that are mostly invisible to people without significant policy expertise. As discussed in 
Section I, the carbon tax reduces emissions at the lowest possible cost by equalizing 
abatement costs across economic sectors. Additionally, it raises revenue that the government 
can use to address regressivity and cut distortionary taxes; it also creates the possibility for 
carbon tariffs to cope with free riders and leakage. Unfortunately, understanding these 
features of the carbon tax requires attention to policy details and at least a rudimentary 
knowledge of economics, so as far as the public is concerned, they might as well not exist—
WYSIATI.175 Not surprisingly, as a result of their survey, Baranzini and Carattini concluded 
“that the lack of perception of primary and ancillary benefits is one of the main barriers to 
the acceptability of carbon taxes.”176 
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D. The Pain of Paying 
We have seen that the out-of-pocket expenditures resulting from a carbon tax are 
salient while the benefits are hidden. This combination of circumstances means that 
discussions of the tax will likely evoke what psychologists call “the pain of paying.”177 
Standard economic models assume that before we buy something, we (consciously or 
unconsciously) consider the opportunity cost of the purchase, which is the highest valued 
alternative good or service that we forgo if we spend our money one way instead of 
another.178 But behavioral economists have shown that thinking about opportunity costs is 
hard work and unnatural, so we often fail to do it.179 What then keeps spending in check? It 
turns out that spending money causes many of us to experience a certain amount of 
psychological discomfort—the pain of paying.180 Unfortunately, the pain of paying is not 
always a reliable guide to wise spending because the degree to which we experience it 
depends on arbitrary situational factors (such as the method of payment or whether we think 
we are getting a bargain) that often have little to do with whether the purchase makes sense 
in light of our goals and preferences.181 
The pain of paying almost certainly biases the public against the carbon tax and in 
favor of regulations and subsidies. Since it is obvious that a carbon tax will require ordinary 
people to pay more for carbon-intensive goods, any discussions of it will very quickly bring 
to mind the pain of paying.182 At the same time, the costs of regulations and subsidies are 
hidden, so the pain of paying is far removed from people’s thoughts about these policies. 
Moreover, carbon tax payments are likely to be particularly painful. In consumer 
transactions, the psychological burden of the payment is usually reduced, at least to some 
extent, by the simultaneous receipt of a valuable good or service.183 By contrast, the 
payment of a carbon tax is not accompanied by any tangible or easily identifiable 
immediate benefit other than, for example, obtaining the same gasoline and electricity that 
used to be available at a lower price. The carbon tax does of course yield benefits in terms of 
reduced carbon emissions and tax revenue that the government can return to taxpayers or 
spend on public goods. But these benefits are mostly hidden, indirect, and diffuse. As a 
result, paying a carbon tax is similar to paying credit card debt, which people regard as 
particularly irksome because payment is not clearly connected to the receipt of specific 
goods.184 
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A growing body of evidence supports the hypothesis that many people view the 
prospect of paying a carbon tax as an especially loathsome burden. For example, members 
of German and Danish focus groups reported that they viewed the energy taxes in their 
respective countries as a “punishment” because reducing energy consumption was difficult 
for them.185 They proposed instead that their governments use “carrots,” such as providing 
rebates to people who achieve an energy conservation target.186 
In contrast to the carbon tax, regulations and subsidies are often accompanied by 
nonenvironmental benefits that are readily identifiable and that mitigate the pain of paying 
any additional costs that these policies impose (assuming that any of those costs are visible 
in the first place). For example, people who support more stringent fuel efficiency standards 
can take comfort in the thought that, while they may pay more for their next car, they will 
also save money on gas. Similarly, a tax credit for hybrid cars makes those cars cheaper, 
which obviously benefits buyers of hybrid cars, even if the benefits may not outweigh the 
hidden cost of the tax increases needed to fund the subsidy.  
Closely related to the pain of paying is the idea that a carbon tax is inferior to green 
subsidies because it is coercive. Numerous studies have found that in many contexts, people 
prefer carrots (subsidies) to sticks (taxes).187 Apparently, people dislike taxes because they 
view them as a form of punishment—an abridgment of freedom—and they prefer instead 
that the government effect change by rewarding good behavior through subsidies.188 But 
this broadly shared belief is an illusion that results from narrow framing and WYSIATI. A 
subsidy indirectly “punishes” those who do not qualify for it. We could frame a tax credit for 
people who buy hybrid cars as a tax penalty for people who do not buy hybrid cars (since 
the credit will result in higher tax bills for the latter group). Viewed in this light, the subsidy 
is just as coercive as a tax. Logically, the two descriptions are equivalent, but 
psychologically, they are worlds apart. 
A similar framing effect biases some environmentalists against the carbon tax and in 
favor of regulation. These environmentalists do not like the idea of placing an explicit price 
on pollution because they view it as creating a license to pollute.189 As Jonathan Masur and 
Eric Posner put it, for some environmentalists, taxing pollution “seem[s] to put a price on 
intrinsically valuable goods like human life and the environment, and . . . seem[s] to permit 
a firm to commit ongoing harm so long as it is willing to pay a fee.”190 The problem with 
this view is that regulations also allow firms to pollute (as long as the firms are otherwise in 
compliance), and unlike with a carbon tax, regulations do not require that polluting firms 
pay for their pollution.191 But this fact is not obvious and WYSIATI. 
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E. Tax-Label Aversion 
Americans appear to suffer from tax-label aversion.192 As a result, a policy labeled as 
a tax may receive less support than a similar policy that is labeled as something else. For 
example, rather than funding spending programs by raising taxes, the government can 
sometimes substitute tax expenditures, which are special tax deductions, exclusions, or 
credits intended to modify behavior or confer benefits upon particular categories of 
taxpayers.193 While the government could accomplish the goals of many tax expenditures 
more simply and efficiently using direct spending, tax expenditures are more politically 
popular. They are especially popular among Republicans and conservatives because they can 
be framed as a tax cut.194 Moreover, the fact that tax expenditures entail increases in 
overall tax rates is apparently less than obvious. 
Similarly, regulations can substitute for taxes, as occurs when the government 
mandates that firms provide particular goods and services for free to certain customers, and 
the firms respond by increasing prices paid by other customers.195 A likely reason that this 
type of regulation is popular is that it avoids the need for the government itself to pay for 
the goods and services by raising taxes. 
A number of scholars have speculated that tax-label aversion undermines public 
support for the carbon tax.196 For example, David Hardisty and his colleagues found that 
participants in their study—especially Republicans and independents—were more likely to 
support a policy that would increase the price of carbon-intensive goods if the researchers 
referred to the policy as a carbon “offset” rather than a carbon “tax.”197 The existence of 
tax-label aversion is also consistent with efforts by those who oppose government action on 
climate change to rebrand carbon cap-and-trade proposals as “cap-and-tax.”198 The obvious 
intent is to make cap-and-trade anathema to those who have a strong aversion to the 
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dreaded t-word. 
What then are the psychological mechanisms that contribute to tax-label aversion, 
especially as it relates to the carbon tax? Part of the explanation is that the word “tax” 
triggers thoughts of costs and losses, a point that I discussed in Part II.C of this Section. 
In addition, among Republicans and conservatives, an aversion to the carbon tax label 
flows naturally from the psychology of associative memory. The word “tax” almost certainly 
triggers strong negative associations for many Republicans and conservatives. The 
Republican Party is the partisan home of the anti-tax movement. The document that 
describes the Party’s official platform refers frequently to the ideas that taxes are excessive, 
impede economic growth, and facilitate wasteful government spending.199 Grover Norquist’s 
famous anti-tax pledge requires that signees “make a written commitment to oppose any 
and all tax increases” and “has become practically required for Republicans seeking 
office.”200 Some prominent commentators on the right argue that taxes are a form of 
theft.201 Moreover, anti-tax sentiment among conservatives is not new and has in fact been 
around for decades.202 
In addition to negative associations in memory, Republicans and conservatives likely 
also have a strong negative attitude toward taxes. The positive and negative attitudes that 
we have toward various categories of objects frequently serve the useful purpose of quickly 
alerting us to promising opportunities that are worthy of approach and dangerous threats to 
be avoided.203 We often form our attitudes based upon the prototype or exemplar that comes 
to mind when thinking about a particular category.204 Unfortunately, this means that we 
sometimes overgeneralize so that a generic attitude does not fit specific objects that are very 
different from our prototype or exemplar for the category to which those objects belong.205 
For example, if your attitude toward snakes is based upon encounters with dangerous 
copperheads, you may react with excessive alarm at the sight of a less threatening species. 
Similarly, the attitude that most conservatives have toward taxes is shaped by familiar 
taxes such as the income tax, which, according to many conservatives, contribute to wasteful 
government spending and inhibit economic growth by reducing the supply of labor and 
capital.206 But this generic attitude does not necessarily match well with the less familiar 
carbon tax. Unlike the income tax, the primary purpose of the carbon tax is to reduce carbon 
emissions, not raise revenue. In fact, the government could achieve its environmental goals 
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with a revenue-neutral carbon tax in which it used all of the revenue to cut other taxes that 
conservatives dislike. Nonetheless, the word “tax” in the phrase “carbon tax” results in 
guilt by association.207 
Of course, even if Republicans appreciated the differences between the carbon tax and 
the income tax, we might still expect them to object to the carbon tax because, according to 
conventional wisdom, they have a negative attitude toward government intervention in 
general. But as we have seen, many Republicans are open to addressing global warming 
through command-and-control regulations and green subsidies. Recognizing tax-label 
aversion can help us understand why green subsidies in particular are so popular among 
Republicans. 
Green subsidies often take the form of tax expenditures such as tax credits for hybrid 
cars. As I have already mentioned, many Republicans prefer tax expenditures to 
economically equivalent direct spending programs. This could be because the cost of tax 
expenditures is hidden (and WYSIATI) or because tax expenditures do not fit the prototype of 
a government program so, unlike the carbon tax, they do not trigger the generic negative 
attitude toward government. In any event, Republicans’ general fondness for tax 
expenditures translates to the climate policy context. 
F. Manipulation, Demagoguery, and the Carbon Tax 
As discussed in Part II.B of this Section, the peripheral route to attitude change, which 
involves manipulating superficial aspects of a message, works best when the audience lacks 
the knowledge or motivation to fully analyze arguments. We have also seen that emotions 
are especially likely to influence judgment and decisionmaking when the relevant issue is 
unfamiliar, of little personal relevance, receives limited time and attention, and does not 
demand accuracy or detailed consideration. In particular, research on the influence of 
emotions on judgment has found that people sometimes invoke a feelings-as-information 
heuristic, appraising a stimulus by (implicitly) asking themselves, “How do I feel about 
it?”208 Unfortunately, people sometimes attribute their current affective state to the wrong 
stimulus, which affects their judgment.209 For example, people are more likely to 
characterize a politician positively if they just watched a happy movie than if they watched a 
sad one; misattributing momentary mood can influence judgment.210 Researchers have even 
found that they can manipulate people’s preferences for public policy by inducing particular 
emotional states prior to asking survey questions.211 
Given that the carbon tax is a sophisticated solution to a complex problem and that 
most voters have little reason to try to understand either the solution or the problem, 
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conditions are ripe for manipulation, including emotional appeals and demagoguery. Recall 
the tendency to substitute easy questions for hard questions. “How do I feel about a carbon 
tax?” is an easier question than “What do I think about a carbon tax?” Not surprisingly, 
then, it is easy to find propaganda disseminated by prominent carbon tax opponents that 
contains highly inflammatory rhetoric obviously intended to evoke fear and uncertainty. 
Opponents claim that the carbon tax will “put the financial screws to the American 
people,”212 and that it is an “inherently parasitic” policy that embraces “the vision of 
transforming America into a European-style socialist welfare state.”213 This type of 
rhetoric—though it arguably has little cognitive content or logical connection to the merits of 
taxing carbon—may frighten voters, causing them to attribute their fear to the tax itself 
rather than the emotionally charged terms chosen to describe it. Inflammatory rhetoric also 
takes advantage of the fact—well known among advertising executives—that people’s 
attitudes toward an object can be modified by associating it with emotionally arousing 
stimuli.214 
G. Motivated Reasoning 
Up to this point, I have assumed that voters evaluate policies superficially, relying on 
emotion and simple heuristics. That assumption is consistent with the low personal stakes 
involved, the empirical evidence on voter ignorance, and prior literature on behavioral 
public choice that emphasizes voters’ lack of incentive to think deeply about politics and 
policy.215 Some voters, however, may expend more effort analyzing policies because, for 
example, they are naturally prone to cognitive reflection,216 or their partisan affiliation 
plays a large role in their social identities, which causes them to find politics engaging.217 
For these voters, we might hope that more elaborate mental processing would produce 
better judgment. Unfortunately, our thinking can be biased even when we exert effort.218 
One reason why is motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning occurs when we assess 
information and arguments with a goal other than finding the truth.219 In particular, we 
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tend to separate the world into in-groups and out-groups—us versus them.220 We then 
unconsciously interpret facts and other information in ways that serve the interests of in-
groups.221 A simple example occurs when fans of opposing football teams react to 
controversial plays as if they are not watching the same game.222 Defending the views and 
values of an important in-group protects our social identity and signals loyalty to the 
group.223 Political partisans, for example, may be motivated to conform their views to those 
which are associated with their favorite political party or with people who share their 
ideology or political outlook. In the contemporary United States, political parties play a 
significant and increasingly important role in defining partisans’ identities, with partisans 
favoring co-partisans, while disliking and discriminating against opposing partisans.224 In 
addition, when it comes to public policy—over which we as individual voters have little 
control—we can often further our own self-interest by conforming our views to those held by 
fellow partisans rather than by maintaining an unbiased commitment to the truth.225 
An experiment by Geoffrey Cohen illustrates the tendency of partisans to conform to 
their party’s views. Cohen found that in the absence of information about the Democratic 
Party’s position, liberals strongly supported a proposed job-training program, reasoning 
that it would help the poor “find employment and support themselves.”226 But when they 
were informed that Democratic lawmakers opposed the proposal, liberals strongly opposed 
it, noting that it would “dump beneficiaries into menial labor,” and suggesting that it 
represented the abandonment of humanitarianism for rugged individualism.227 Importantly, 
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Cohen found that this outcome did not result from shallow cognitive processing or a simple 
adopt-the-party’s-view heuristic.228 On the contrary, Cohen found evidence of deep 
processing.229 Nonetheless, informing liberals of the position taken by Democratic 
lawmakers altered the factual aspects of the policy on which they focused and the moral 
connotations that it invoked.230 Moreover, study participants were unaware that their 
partisan affiliation had biased their views and indicated that they had based their 
judgments on the policy’s merits.231 
Motivated reasoning is relevant to this Article in part because opposition to taxes in 
general and to the carbon tax in particular has become closely linked to membership in the 
Republican Party and to the conservative movement. The Republican Party is known for its 
hostility to taxes.232 And while some high-level members of the party once favored placing a 
price on carbon,233 the party’s current official position is that the carbon tax is bad for the 
country.234 Among voters, Republicans are much more likely to oppose the carbon tax than 
Democrats.235 Moreover, opposition among Republican voters does not simply stem from 
skepticism about climate change. Recent polls show that many Republicans believe that 
climate change is occurring236 and favor government action.237 As we have seen, however, 
they eschew the carbon tax in favor of command-and-control regulations and green 
subsidies.238 A likely explanation is that opposing taxes of any kind, and especially a 
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carbon tax, has become part of what it means to be a Republican and, more generally, a 
conservative. 
This close link between the Republican Party and opposition to the carbon tax implies 
that Republican voters will likely engage in motivated reasoning to defend the party line. 
This means that they are likely to notice aspects of the carbon tax that are inconsistent with 
Republican values and conservative ideology; for example, it interferes with markets and 
puts money in the hands of government. They are unlikely to notice aspects that 
conservatives ought to find appealing; for example, the tax can be revenue neutral and can 
be more efficient and less intrusive than alternative policies. 
H. Conservative Voters Versus Conservative Economists 
To summarize the discussion in this Section, voter psychology undermines support for a 
carbon tax. Compared to other climate policies, the costs of a carbon tax are more obvious 
and the benefits are less visible, both of which distort the intuitive cost-benefit analysis in 
which voters typically engage. In addition, tax-label aversion renders the carbon tax 
anathema to many Americans, especially Republicans and conservatives, even though a 
carbon tax could achieve its environmental goals even if it were revenue neutral. Moreover, 
the policy’s complexity, combined with voter ignorance, exposes voters to manipulation and 
demagoguery. Finally, the close link between the Republican Party and carbon tax 
opposition means that many Republican voters will reflexively oppose the carbon tax 
regardless of its merits. 
The discussion so far helps us understand why many conservative economists disagree 
with other conservatives with respect to the carbon tax. In stark contrast to the views of 
rank-and-file Republicans, a number of prominent conservative economists have recently 
promoted the idea of a policy swap in which conservatives would agree to a revenue-neutral 
carbon tax if environmentalists agree to eliminate global warming regulations and green 
subsidies.239 Why? As part of their professional training, economists encounter the economic 
case for Pigouvian taxes, which is covered in textbooks on introductory economics. Although 
it is not a panacea, training can be an effective tool for overcoming bias.240 In particular, 
conservative economists, likely because of their education, can easily distinguish the goals 
and features of the carbon tax from other taxes of which they are more skeptical. So a 
conservative economist is less likely than a conservative who lacks training in economics to 
suffer from tax-label aversion and to be biased by a generic, negative attitude toward taxes. 
Moreover, the demands of the economics profession dictate that economists avoid obvious 
mistakes, such as substituting an easy question (“How do I feel about a carbon tax?”) for a 
hard question (“What do I think about a carbon tax?”). 
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III. VOTER PSYCHOLOGY AND CARBON TAX DESIGN 
Section II argued that voter psychology impedes the adoption of a carbon tax. This 
Section assumes that carbon tax advocates somehow overcome that obstacle and discusses 
ways in which psychology might influence how the public thinks about the details of the 
carbon tax. Specifically, this Section argues that psychology biases voters against certain 
features of the carbon tax despite the fact that those features would make the tax more 
efficient. 
This Section is necessarily speculative. Given that most voters pay little attention to 
policy debates, it is not completely clear what opinions (if any) voters might have with 
respect to the nuances of the carbon tax and to what extent public opinion will actually 
influence the law. Public opinion will almost certainly affect whether the government can 
adopt a carbon tax, and it will likely place broad constraints on the exact form that the tax 
would take, including constraints on the initial tax rate. But beyond that, the public may 
leave the details up to politicians and bureaucrats. 
Nevertheless, understanding how the public might think about certain features of the 
carbon tax is still important. I will argue, for example, that the public will very likely favor 
a tax rate that differs from what economic analysis suggests to be the optimal rate. Given 
this, carbon tax proponents may want to advocate that Congress delegate the power to set 
the rate to an independent or executive agency comprising economists and other experts 
who are less susceptible to public pressure than are members of Congress. 
A. The Tax Rate 
As discussed in Section I, the optimal carbon tax rate equals the social cost of carbon. 
Estimates of the social cost of carbon vary depending on the model used, the discount rate 
applied, and assumptions about the occurrence of certain low-probability events that would 
cause extreme damage. As a result, the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of 
Greenhouse Gases (IWG), which provides estimates of the social cost of carbon for use by 
federal regulatory agencies in cost-benefit analyses, offers a range of estimates.241 For 
2015, the IWG’s central estimate of the social cost was $36 per ton of carbon dioxide, but 
the IWG’s estimates varied depending on specific assumptions and ranged from $11 to $105 
per ton.242 This lack of precision creates cover for industry groups and environmentalists to 
argue in self-serving fashion for either a lower or higher rate. 
What rate will the public support? The answer is highly uncertain. While the public 
favors action to combat global warming, support declines dramatically when pollsters 
mention even small costs.243 In other words, the public is not yet willing to make the 
sacrifice that economic models indicate is necessary. This suggests that, to garner public 
support, the carbon tax rate would, at least initially, have to be lower than the IWG’s 
central estimate. 
Moreover, once a small tax is in place, the public may strongly resist rate increases. 
After all, they would burden virtually everyone in the country. People may also become 
anchored to the initial rate. Behavioral economists have shown that when the intrinsic value 
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of an item is ambiguous, consumers’ willingness to pay for it can be influenced by arbitrary 
anchors.244 Similarly, the optimal carbon tax rate is highly ambiguous, so people may fixate 
on the initial rate and assume it is optimal even if it is not. Consistent with the notion that 
the initial rate may prove sticky, the public strongly opposes increasing existing taxes on 
gasoline and on income (except on the wealthy).245 
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that, after adoption of a small tax, the 
public might, over time, support (or at least not steadfastly oppose) increasing the tax rate. 
Various psychological forces could contribute to a slippery-slope phenomenon that would 
work to the benefit of those who favor a higher rate. 
The first is extremeness aversion, which is the idea that “the attractiveness of an 
option is enhanced if it is an intermediate option in the choice set and is diminished if it is 
an extreme option.”246 Because of extremeness aversion, voters may favor policies framed 
as the moderate position falling between two extremes.247 Of course, whether a policy is 
extreme or moderate depends on the baseline. A small carbon tax might today seem like a 
moderate compromise between the two extremes of no tax and the IWG’s central estimate. 
But once the small tax is in place, the baseline may shift so that the small tax (rather than 
no tax) will be the new starting point in any discussions about the appropriate rate.  
Second, the initial adoption of a small carbon tax could allow advocates of higher 
taxes to take advantage of the foot-in-the-door technique. Psychologists have shown that 
you can increase the chances of obtaining compliance with a large request by first making a 
similar, but smaller, request.248 Apparently, compliance with the first request creates a 
desire for consistency and causes people to conclude that they are the type of people who 
comply with such requests.249 So if advocates persuade the public to support a small carbon 
tax, then, once that tax is in place, support for a larger tax may follow more readily. 
The upshot is significant uncertainty regarding what carbon tax rate the public might 
ultimately support. Initially, the public would likely accept, at most, only a small tax, but 
once the tax is in place, voters may tolerate increases.250 In any event, we have reason to 
believe that expert estimates of the social cost of carbon will have little influence on public 
opinion as to the appropriate rate. Instead, logically irrelevant factors will likely play a 
significant role. 
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B. Exemptions 
As discussed in Section I, a broad-based carbon tax would minimize the cost of 
addressing global warming by equalizing the marginal cost of abatement across economic 
sectors so that society could not save money by reallocating abatement efforts from one 
sector to another. In practice, however, industry groups will lobby for exemptions, and, if 
they succeed, then some emissions will escape taxation. Large exemptions could 
dramatically increase costs. For example, if the government taxes gasoline but exempts coal 
used to generate electricity, then the country will forgo relatively cheap opportunities to 
abate emissions in power generation. 
Unfortunately, exemptions will also have substantial psychological appeal for voters. 
While people are concerned about global warming, they also have little interest in 
addressing it by punishing themselves or others like themselves.251 It will be easy to justify 
any given exemption by arguing that the exemption will help the poor or unburden some 
crucial activity or economic sector. And while the benefits (and beneficiaries) of exemptions 
will be obvious, their cost (and who pays them) will not—and WYSIATI. Based on what we 
know about their ignorance of economics,252 we cannot expect that voters will appreciate the 
importance of a uniform marginal cost of abatement. 
In this respect, the psychological appeal of carbon tax exemptions is similar to that of 
tax expenditures in the context of the income tax. Given the parallels between carbon tax 
exemptions and tax expenditures, it is not surprising that in countries that have adopted 
carbon taxes, exemptions are common and have at least partially undermined 
effectiveness.253 Similarly, the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill that passed the House of 
Representatives in 2009, which would have priced carbon emissions in a manner somewhat 
similar to a carbon tax, exempted certain industries from its coverage and contained 
numerous subsidies for various industries that were not exempt.254 
C. Use of Funds 
As discussed in Section I, the government would have to use only a small portion of 
carbon tax revenue to offset the disproportionate burden that the tax imposes on the poor. 
What about the remaining funds? 
Setting aside concerns about distribution, economists generally recommend that the 
government use carbon tax revenue in a way that maximizes the social benefit. In 
particular, many economists support using a large portion of the revenue to cut existing 
taxes because doing so would address the tax-interaction effect.255 The carbon tax will 
increase the price of carbon-intensive goods, which will reduce the real return to both labor 
and capital. In other words, the same amount of wages or investment income will not buy as 
much once a carbon tax is in place. In this way, a carbon tax would interact with income and 
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payroll taxes and compound existing distortions in labor and capital markets—an effect 
that would operate as a drag on economic growth. The government could address this 
problem by using carbon tax revenue to cut existing taxes.256 
Voters, however, appear to be oblivious to the tax-interaction effect. Polls generally 
find that the carbon tax does not become more popular when pollsters link it to income and 
payroll tax cuts. Instead, if the government opts to return carbon tax revenue to taxpayers, 
voters prefer to receive lump-sum refund checks.257 The problem with lump-sum refunds is 
that they do not address the tax-interaction effect, so they substantially increase the overall 
cost of climate change mitigation.258 
A second possible use for carbon tax revenue is to increase spending on government 
programs. Increasing spending in this way would make sense if the expected benefits 
exceeded those associated with using the money to fund tax cuts or reduce the deficit.259 As 
a result, some economists support spending at least part of any carbon tax revenue on, for 
instance, improvements to infrastructure.260 
Similarly, some economists point to the models of path-dependent innovation 
discussed in Section I to argue that the government should use carbon tax revenue to 
subsidize clean technology research, deployment, and adoption.261 This is one point on 
which voters tend to agree with the experts (or at least with some experts). Earmarking 
carbon tax revenue for green subsidies substantially increases public support.262 Similarly, 
experience shows that governments tend to earmark environmental tax revenue for 
environmental programs.263 
Why? As discussed in Section II, evidence from focus groups indicates that many people 
ignore the incentive effects of environmental taxes and conclude that they will be ineffective 
unless the government uses the resulting revenue to fund environmental programs. In 
addition, subsidies satisfy the desire to affirmatively address global warming in an obvious 
and direct way by linking carbon tax payments to specific actions. They also likely reduce 
the pain of paying the carbon tax by linking the tax to a salient benefit.264 (“At least my 
carbon tax payment is paying for solar panels and isn’t going to waste!”) 
While the public’s embrace of green subsidies is consistent with the view of some 
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experts, caution is warranted. Recall from Section I that economic models of path-dependent 
innovation justify carefully designed subsidies. As I discuss below, the public is likely to 
ignore the need for careful design. 
D. Carbon Tariffs 
As discussed in Section I, after adopting a carbon tax, the United States could deal with 
the problem of free riders and leakage by taxing imports from rogue nations that refuse to 
place a price on carbon. Because the optimal carbon tariff will vary from industry to industry 
and will be difficult to determine precisely, rent-seeking industry groups may lobby for 
excessive tariffs, using the carbon tax as a pretext to justify protectionist policies. Given that 
excessive tariffs would harm consumers by increasing prices, we might expect that most 
voters would oppose them (if they happened to be paying attention). 
Psychology, however, suggests otherwise. We have seen that people tend to divide the 
world into in-groups and out-groups.265 Members of in-groups are deemed more virtuous, 
friendly, and trustworthy.266 In extreme cases, members of out-groups become objects of 
disdain or hatred.267 Xenophobia, which is hatred or fear of foreigners, is a particularly 
intense form of in-group bias. 
While tariffs harm consumers, they also appeal to xenophobes. Moreover, the harm 
that tariffs cause is not always obvious (and WYSIATI), so xenophobia may win out. In fact, 
in stark contrast to economists, the public generally likes tariffs and other trade barriers.268 
As a result, if the United States adopts a carbon tax, industry groups whose members face 
foreign competition would likely fan the flames of xenophobia to convince the public to 
support excessive carbon tariffs. (“Those crafty Chinese are manipulating their currency and 
they don’t have a carbon tax. We have to protect ourselves with higher tariffs on Chinese 
goods!”) Concerns about excessive carbon tariffs are particularly acute at present because 
nationalism and protectionism have become potent forces in American politics. For example, 
President Trump made protectionist tariffs a centerpiece of his election campaign and argued 
that the United States “can’t continue to allow China to rape our country, and that’s what 
they’re doing.”269 
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Sections I through III argued that voters are biased against the carbon tax even though 
experts favor it and that voters are biased in favor of particular design features that would 
make the carbon tax less efficient. This Section discusses strategies for overcoming these 
problems. The potential solutions are to educate and debias voters, to manipulate voters’ 
biases, and to delegate power to bureaucrats. None of these solutions are perfect, but all of 
them have potential. 
A. Educating and Debiasing Voters 
Educating voters about the carbon tax will be an uphill battle. As discussed in Section 
II, voters have little reason to pay attention to policy debates, and studies of political 
knowledge confirm that most do not. Moreover, even if carbon tax proponents obtain the 
attention of voters, persuading them to support an optimally designed carbon tax would 
mean overcoming the many psychological impediments discussed in Sections II and III, 
which is no small task.270 
One approach, which has already been tried, is to emphasize that economists and 
other experts favor a carbon tax.271 The problem with this tactic is that motivated reasoning 
may lead people (whether conservative or liberal) who are already skeptical of the carbon 
tax to question the credibility of the experts who favor it. Whether a person views an expert 
as knowledgeable, trustworthy, and credible depends in large part on whether he or she 
believes that the expert’s values and worldview are in line with his or her own.272 Moreover, 
on issues that divide people along cultural or political lines, people are often quick to 
discredit an expert who otherwise has impeccable credentials simply because they disagree 
with the expert’s conclusions.273 As a result, conservatives who think the carbon tax is just 
another big-government scheme will likely dismiss as untrustworthy arguments to the 
contrary made by economists perceived as liberal.274 Similarly, liberal environmentalists 
who favor command-and-control regulations and who view the carbon tax as creating a 
license to pollute may dismiss contrary arguments made by economists perceived as 
conservative. 
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Especially relevant in this regard, Dan Kahan and his colleagues have found that 
people’s views on various policy-relevant facts are colored by their values and by the values 
of what Kahan refers to as identity-defining affinity groups.275 Some facts become imbued 
with social meaning, distorting people’s perceptions. In particular, a person’s view of 
whether experts have reached a consensus on certain policy-relevant facts often depends on 
whether those facts, if true, conflict with the values and worldview of that person or with the 
values and worldview of that person’s affinity group.276 In other words, the existence or 
nonexistence of expert consensus is a fact that can take on social meaning. Specifically, 
Kahan has found “a strong correlation between individuals’ cultural values and their 
perceptions of scientific consensus on risks known to divide persons of opposing 
worldviews,” including the existence and causes of global warming, the risks of nuclear 
waste disposal, and the effects of allowing people to carry concealed handguns.277 Kahan 
argues that people “systematically overestimate the degree of scientific support for positions 
they are culturally predisposed to accept,” and this occurs because “of a cultural availability 
effect that influences how readily they can recall instances of expert endorsement of those 
positions.”278 These findings suggest that carbon tax advocates may not accomplish much by 
informing people that, as a group, economists generally agree that the carbon tax is the 
best policy for addressing global warming. If that message appears to conflict with the 
deeply held values of individual voters or the affinity groups to which they belong, it will 
automatically engender skepticism. 
All of this suggests that debiasing voters will be difficult, especially since opponents of 
the carbon tax can easily demagogue the issue.279 But there is reason for limited optimism. 
For example, progress might be possible if opposition to the carbon tax becomes 
disentangled from membership in the Republican Party. Researchers have found evidence 
that certain communications strategies can disconnect beliefs from identity, including social 
identity, and make people more receptive to ideas they are naturally prone to dismiss.280 
One technique, called identity affirmation, is designed to combat the tendency to 
automatically dismiss information that appears to threaten strongly held values by 
presenting it in a way that affirms those values instead.281 Carbon tax advocates could 
emphasize aspects of the carbon tax consistent with the values of Republicans and 
conservatives, including the possibility that the tax could be revenue neutral or that it could 
be adopted in connection with relaxing regulations on nuclear power. A second technique, 
called pluralistic advocacy, is designed to combat the tendency for people to reject the 
arguments of experts whose values they do not share.282 Communications supporting the 
carbon tax could feature experts with diverse values, including Republicans and 
conservatives as well as Democrats and liberals. 
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In addition to recruiting the assistance of a diverse group of experts, carbon tax 
proponents may also want to appeal to leaders within the Republican Party by arguing that 
a carbon tax is better than the alternatives. With evidence for global warming mounting and 
with denialism among the public on the wane, global warming regulation may be inevitable. 
Although President Trump has expressed skepticism about climate change, as recently as 
2008, the Republican Party’s official platform contained a section titled “Addressing Climate 
Change Responsibly,” and John McCain, the party’s presidential nominee that year, 
advocated a carbon cap-and-trade program, which would have effectively placed a price on 
carbon.283 At that time, the party’s position comported with the actions of previous 
Republican presidents who had used cap-and-trade programs to reduce lead in gasoline and 
to address acid rain. But by 2009, when Democrats introduced carbon cap-and-trade 
legislation, the vast majority of Republicans voted against it, with many deriding it as “cap-
and-tax.”284 As a general matter, politicians, to set themselves apart and to avoid being 
perceived as appeasing the other side, sometimes have an incentive to confront, rather than 
cooperate with, their counterparts in the opposing party even with respect to proposals 
about which the two sides would otherwise agree.285 So one likely explanation for the rapid 
change in the Republican Party’s official position on pricing carbon is that, in response to 
President Obama’s aggressive climate change agenda, Republican politicians seized an 
opportunity to distinguish themselves from Democrats by rejecting a policy to which at least 
some of them were previously sympathetic.286 In fact, a sizable minority of Republicans in 
Congress may favor addressing global warming even though they currently are not 
comfortable discussing their position publicly.287 
If the leadership within the Republican Party changes its position on the carbon tax, 
then we have reason to believe that many Republican voters will follow suit.288 Consider, for 
example, a recent poll that found that several important policy proposals (e.g., universal 
healthcare) received significantly more support among Republicans if the pollster noted that 
then Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump supported them than if the pollster 
noted that a prominent Democrat supported them.289 Findings like this one are consistent 
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with the evidence discussed in Part II.G that some partisans favor certain policies, 
regardless of their merits, simply because those policies are associated with a particular 
political party. At present, this phenomenon works against the carbon tax because the 
Republican Party is officially opposed to the policy. But that could change. In fact, evidence 
suggests that people are especially likely to support a policy when that policy is endorsed by 
a party and the endorsement appears to contradict the assumed ideology of the party’s 
members,290 which would be the case if the Republican Party supported a carbon tax. 
B. Manipulating Voters’ Biases 
Given that educating and debiasing voters will be difficult, an alternative strategy is 
simply to recognize and manipulate their biases.291 This strategy is implicit in at least four 
techniques that carbon tax proponents have employed or recommended. The first technique 
is to time the adoption of the tax to correspond to a period in which the market price of 
gasoline is falling rapidly.292 The apparent purpose of this approach is to take advantage of 
the fact that consumers may be psychologically anchored to a high gasoline price so that 
maintaining that price—by creating a tax that effectively offsets the decline in the market 
price that would otherwise occur—will be less painful and more politically palatable than 
adding to an already high price.293 The second technique is to link carbon tax revenue to 
green subsidies in an effort to leverage voters’ bias in favor of these subsidies.294 The third 
technique is to reframe the carbon tax as a penalty imposed on firms that pollute rather 
than as a tax paid by consumers.295 Here, the apparent purpose is to pretend that 
unsympathetic (and faceless) corporations will bear the burden of global warming mitigation 
and hope that voters (because of WYSIATI) do not realize that those corporations will likely 
pass most of the tax through to consumers in the form of higher prices. The fourth technique 
is to combat tax-label aversion by referring to the carbon tax as something other than a tax, 
for example, a “climate contribution.”296 
Carbon tax proponents might rationalize attempts to manipulate voters’ biases on the 
grounds that the ends justify the means and that if voters were fully informed and unbiased, 
then they would agree with the ends. In support of this position, there is evidence that, 
while they are initially unpopular, Pigouvian taxes can become more popular once they are 
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adopted.297 For example, Maria Börjesson and her colleagues examined public support for 
tolls designed to curb road congestion in Stockholm, Sweden.298 Support was initially tepid, 
but increased dramatically after the tolls went into effect.299 A primary reason was that, 
after gaining experience with the tolls, more people became convinced that they worked.300 
Perhaps the same phenomenon would occur following the adoption of a carbon tax. 
Nonetheless, manipulating voters’ biases is not without drawbacks. First, it may not 
work. In particular, the first, third, and fourth techniques discussed above may be too 
transparent, particularly given that opponents will seek to expose these techniques as 
deceptive ploys.301 
Second, attempting to manipulate voters can have unintended consequences. Shane 
Gunster describes how the Liberal Party in British Columbia tried to reduce resistance to its 
proposed carbon tax by not only describing it as revenue neutral, but also by repeatedly 
claiming that the tax would benefit everyone and implying that it required no sacrifices.302 
Gunster concludes that this strategy backfired because opponents of the tax made the 
obvious point that, even with revenue neutrality, not everyone would come out even.303 Once 
this fact was established, proponents of the tax appeared mealy-mouthed.  
Similarly, the second technique mentioned above—marketing the carbon tax as a 
mechanism for funding green subsidies—could also backfire. We have seen that economic 
models of path-dependent innovation can justify subsidies for clean technology.304 This 
presents an important opportunity for carbon tax advocates because combining these 
subsidies with a carbon tax tends to make the carbon tax more popular.305 But as discussed 
in Section I, green subsidies must be carefully designed or they can result in wasted 
resources and even cause the economy to become locked into a harmful technological path. 
This nuance, however, will likely be lost on the public. The public’s support for green 
subsidies does not rest on models of path-dependent innovation. After all, those models are 
relatively new, and public support for subsidies predates them. Instead, the public supports 
subsidies for the psychological reasons mentioned in Section II. Subsidies at least seem to 
directly address global warming in an obvious way and with little to no apparent cost. This 
means that public support for subsidies will likely be overbroad and extend to bad policies 
as well as good ones.306 This is problematic because certain special interest groups have an 
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incentive to manipulate the public’s fondness for subsidies—be they industry groups 
seeking government handouts or overzealous environmentalists eager to see more money 
spent on environmental programs.  
Finally, manipulating voters’ biases raises ethical concerns. Starting with Immanuel 
Kant, a number of political philosophers and commentators have supported the principle of 
publicity, which holds that a political action is illegitimate unless the person taking it could 
at least hypothetically defend it in public.307 An action is incompatible with the principle of 
publicity when actual publicity would be self-frustrating, would undermine related policy 
goals, or would inevitably arouse general opposition.308 Consciously manipulating voters’ 
biases via deceptive techniques satisfies these conditions and, therefore, violates the 
publicity principle. 
On the other hand, carbon tax proponents might find that noble lies are acceptable to 
the extent that they counteract harmful voter biases. The philosopher and legal ethicist 
David Luban has argued that the strongest rationale for the publicity principle is the notion 
that actions or policies that cannot garner public support are, for that reason, wrong.309 
Luban notes that the publicity principle is false if the public is “ill-informed, incompetent, 
[or] prejudiced,” and if public officials are “less ignorant or less wrong-headed.”310 Luban 
himself is skeptical “that policymakers are wiser and better than their fellows” but admits 
that “whether and when the publicity principle is defensible” is an empirical question.311 
Luban’s observation provides a nice segue into a discussion of potential bureaucratic 
solutions to the problem of anti-carbon-tax bias. 
C. Delegating Power to Bureaucrats 
Because of voter bias and interest group influence, adopting a carbon tax through the 
legislative process (especially one that maximizes efficiency) will be difficult. An alternative 
strategy is to delegate power to bureaucrats, who are more insulated than politicians from 
political pressure.312 Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner present a compelling case that under 
the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) currently has the power to 
adopt a carbon tax without further congressional action.313 However, due to constraints on 
its power, any carbon tax that the EPA adopts would be suboptimal. For example, under the 
Clean Air Act, the EPA could not impose the tax directly on firms that extract, process, or 
import fossil fuels, but would instead have to impose it further down the production chain on 
firms that actually emit carbon in the production process.314 For practical reasons, this 
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means that some carbon emissions would escape taxation.315 But even a suboptimal carbon 
tax might be better than the alternative, especially if it paved the way for a tax that was 
closer to optimal. 
Administratively imposed carbon taxes are tantalizing, but even if legislative action 
proves necessary, Congress or state legislatures might still want to delegate certain 
decisions to administrative agencies. These decisions might include setting and adjusting the 
carbon tax rate and establishing carbon tariffs, both of which are particularly suited to 
bureaucrats because they possess the needed technical expertise and because, compared to 
politicians, they also are less susceptible to influence from interest groups and biased 
voters.316 
Of course, delegating power to bureaucrats comes with risks. To borrow a phrase from 
David Luban, bureaucrats may not be “wiser and better than their fellows.”317 Specifically, 
bureaucrats do not always act in the public interest, and they may instead be motivated to 
maximize the budget and power of their respective agencies, to enhance their own 
reputations, to protect their jobs and salaries, or to advance the agenda of special interest 
groups or industries to which they have connections.318 In addition, bureaucrats are not 
themselves immune to psychological biases.319 One problem is tunnel vision, or the tendency 
to focus on the agency’s mission to the exclusion of competing concerns.320 A second problem 
is that bureaucrats are sometimes overconfident in their ability to understand complex 
problems and in their proposed solutions, which can lead to rules that have unanticipated 
and unintended consequences.321 Both tunnel vision and overconfidence are specific 
manifestations of WYSIATI.322 
Nonetheless, we should keep these concerns about bureaucrats in perspective. Some of 
them are at least partially addressed by established administrative procedures.323 At the 
federal level, agency proposals for significant regulatory action (which would include any 
proposal by the EPA to create a carbon tax) generally must be accompanied by a cost-benefit 
analysis.324 Agency proposals are also subject to centralized review by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, which gathers input from a variety of experts and 
interested parties and circulates proposals among the President’s advisers as well as other 
potentially interested agencies.325 Moreover, agencies must give notice to the public of 
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proposed regulations and provide an opportunity to comment—a process that facilitates 
public participation in rulemaking.326 Finally, courts can strike down regulations deemed 
arbitrary.327 These procedures are not perfect, but by creating a system of checks and 
balances, they mitigate concerns about self-interested bureaucrats who are overconfident 
and suffer from tunnel vision. 
In addition, relative to the regulatory approach that the federal government has 
pursued in recent years, a carbon tax would likely reduce opportunities for bureaucrats to 
make mistakes or abuse their power. The federal government has been addressing global 
warming in a piecemeal fashion, for example, by strengthening automobile fuel efficiency 
standards and increasing energy efficiency standards for appliances and other equipment.328 
This piecemeal approach to global warming mitigation entails a large role for bureaucrats, 
who have to work out the many details that convoluted regulatory regimes entail. 
By contrast, as discussed in Section I, the carbon tax is a relatively simple policy tool. 
The most difficult tasks in implementing it are limited in number and narrowly defined, for 
example, determining the appropriate tax rate and carbon tariffs. If Congress delegates 
these tasks to an administrative agency, it could also adopt procedures to ensure 
transparency. Moreover, bureaucratic discretion would be constrained by scientific and 
economic analyses and by the threat of judicial review. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that psychology makes the carbon tax unappealing to voters despite the 
policy’s favored status among experts. Voters are biased against the tax because they 
conduct an intuitive cost-benefit analysis for which costs are salient, but benefits are not. 
Voters also suffer from tax-label aversion, engage in motivated reasoning, and allow their 
emotions to dictate their views. To achieve success, carbon tax proponents will have to find 
ways to overcome these hurdles. A well-designed communications strategy that focuses on 
identity affirmation and pluralistic advocacy may soften resistance. Another promising 
avenue for exploration is to delegate power to bureaucrats either to adopt a carbon tax or to 
control key features, such as setting the tax rate. 
Carbon tax proponents should also not underestimate the possibility of obtaining 
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support from Republican and conservative leaders, particularly President Trump. Much of 
the anti-carbon-tax bias among conservative voters stems from their general disdain for 
taxes and the fact that opposition to a carbon tax has become a symbol of membership in 
the Republican Party. If Republican leaders reverse course, then Republican voters might 
change their views as well. To that end, in recent years, a number of high-profile 
conservative intellectuals and policy makers have expressed support for a revenue-neutral 
carbon tax that replaces existing regulations. It remains to be seen whether they can 
convince the President. 
 
